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SYNOPSIS.
This work will discuss the problems physical planning is 
facing in Mexico, and to what extent we can expect it to bring the 
necessary changes towards a better national and regional development to the 
country. To be able to understand its socio-economic and political 
reality.
This dissertation's principal objective, then, is to asses 
the role of Physical Planning in Mexico, and why its importance is 
dimminishing. The argument is that the federal government has undermined 
the effectiveness of physical planning by firstly, giving priority to 
national economic growth over balanced regional development and broader 
social development. Secondly, by creating a confusing planning system 
which has allowed the government to keep control of decision-making 
processes. Thirdly, by planners themselves failing to play an active role 
in determining the future of Mexican cities.
It will begin in Chapter One, to discuss why physical 
planning is so im portant and should be considered when taking any 
governmental action. To argue that even when planning was introduced 
almost 40 years ago, it has failed in achieving its goals perhaps because 
it has been regarded by the government as something useless, and it has
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been given little importance. This, may be as a consequence of its fears 
of sharing power, and that planning can increase people's awareness of the 
problems and may begin to ask strongly for solutions.
In the second chapter it will be argued that the effects of 
concentration of economic and political power led to a complete chaos in 
the urban system of the country, wich together with ineffectual 
implementation of policies, are the main problems physical planning is 
facing now; and created an inertia that is very strong to challenge. The 
third chapter will analyse the characteristics of the Mexican urban system 
and the context in which planning has to operate. It will look at the 
different approaches for development the government has taken, and the 
position of planning activity over the years, since the early "regional" 
approach to the more recent of the "national" one.
Chapter IV will set the case study, giving the general 
characteristics of it, and arguing the circumstances why it was chosen as 
an example. While in Chapter V the case of the City of Puebla will be 
developed. Its circumstances analysed and its problems discussed in its 
regional as well as in the national context. The situation of Puebla being 
the target of public and private investment will be discused, and it will 
be argued that despite that, the overall situation of the state has not 
changed considerably as to say most of its population have been benefited 
with these investments. Moreover, it will be argued that in fact, its 
dependency from the capital city has increased. Chapter VI will analyse 
the role of planners in these processes and a possible alternative approach 
in urban planning will be given, while the conclusions about the
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possibilities planners and planning have within the Mexican circumstances 
and how the trends might change, will be drawn in the seventh chapter.
SECTION I 
SETTING THE SCENE
Chapter I
THE NEED FOR PHYSICAL PLANNING
1.1. The purpose of and need for Physical Planning
Physical planning can be seen in different ways depending in 
our approach to the role of the state and how it might operate in our 
society.
It can be considered as being the instrum ent of the state to 
correct the imperfections that the m arket has produced, or as the 
instrum ent of the government working to fulfill the "general interest" 
(Healey, 1983). It can also be seen as the process which seeks changes in 
part (or parts) of a whole to achieve a particular political project (de 
M attos, 1982), being that project the view a given society has of itself.
But whatever the concept of the state and planning we may have, it is also 
clear that some state's actions for the good of some, will inebitably be 
bad for others. In that context, "...planning cannot be seen as a set of 
value-free concepts and entirely objective procedures" (Potter, 1985).
With those concepts in mind, we can accept or refuse the 
concept of planning as something that is needed by our society. But it is 
the state itself who might consider or not the validity of physical 
planning (or any other), as something necessary to be implemented. If it 
does implement it, the government's view of itself is going to influence
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its concept of what, how and when is going to be tackled. This makes 
clearer the government's position in planning. It is the body which 
decides the validity and quality of its output. Furthermore, as Potter 
(1985) argues, planning will always be influenced by the fact of being 
carried out by planners working for the government. As that again, it 
cannot be taken as a neutral activity.
Then, our cities might be suffering social and economic 
problems derived directly from governmental actions and as such, 
governments have to do something to foresee the implications of their 
actions, even if it is only to justify their position in power. This has 
been done in different ways and called with different names in different 
countries, like land use planning, physical planning, urban development, 
etc. Here now, it is im portant to specify that whatever the name, it is 
its achievements what is really important. While in the so called 
developed world they may be discussing the terminology, in the context of 
less developed countries, with scarce resources, enormous problems and 
little time to spare, what is im portant is to Find solutions to the 
problems, whatever the name of the process.
Here then, physical planning will be related to the one 
whose purpose is the understanding of the spatial dimension of the urban 
problems, as well as to the government's actions of whatever character - 
social, economic, etc- as direct cause of the urban reality of our cities, 
and its influence in other sectors of society to act in a given way. W ith 
"spatial dimension" we refer to the territorial structure of social and 
economic activities, public services, etc. which Castells (1981)
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characterises as "urban organization". It is the organisation of space and 
its understanding what can make us to give better responses to those 
problems.
Another aspect affecting planning is the term "Developing 
World" or countries, compared to a "Developed World". This could mean on 
the one hand, that the "developed" world (thus planning) has already 
reached its higher development possible, what is in all terms absurd, given 
the circumstances for example, of the urban poor in countries like G reat 
Britain or the USA. As it is also clear tha t the "developed" world is by 
all means also a developing world. Furtherm ore, within the developed world 
there are countries more developed than others. In that case, countries 
like Britain could be called "developing", if for example, they are 
compared with Germany or any Scandinavian nation.
On the other hand, and most dangerously, the term 
"developing" world could, and have, lead some analysts to the conclusion 
tha t those countries would have inevitably to follow the steps already 
given by "developed" countries ie. That they are in a state of transition 
towards the contemporary situation in developed countries, they forget for 
example, th a t the contemporary situation in underdeveloped countries is in 
no way comparable to that of the "advanced" countries prior to their 
industrialization (Santos, 1973; Sutcliffe, 1971).
T hat assumption denies all the historical and contextual 
characteristics of the less developed countries as well as their right to 
look for a "self made" way to development. Planning -and any other
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activity- therefore, do not necessarely has the same connotations or to 
follow the same steps of those in advanced countries simply because it is 
being implemented in less developed countries. Which is im portant since 
now given the economic crisis throughout third world countries, financial 
institutions in more developed countries have been making pressure on them 
to apply for example, certain meassures to stress economic growth over 
social development. This, assuming as the basis for their approach, that 
they should follow the policies more developed countries are applying or 
have applied. Policies which in cases like Britain, might be against or 
going away of planning activity (Hague, 1984; Cullingworth, 1985), or 
indeed social investment.
That is why the purpose and role of planning in 
underdeveloped countries is so important: to understand and to give 
responses to governmental actions.
In this context, physical planning can be considered one of 
the levels of policy making with more concreteness of development policies.
It is at this level where all the abstractions of National Development 
policy touches the ground, it is at this level also, where all the 
conceptual and operational framework of policy analysis of the urban 
economy refers to the physical forms of cities, to their internal 
characteristics and physical arrangement. All economic, social and 
political policies of the government intended for national growth will 
finally be achieved and/or reflected by physical actions within the cities. 
Directly or indirectly then, governmental actions will have an impact on 
the shape and life of the cities and their inhabitants.
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To make more im portant the role of physical planning, it has 
been shown that a fast urban expansion with the characteristics of the ones 
th a t are ocurring in the developing countries has been accompanied most of 
the time by massive migration, open unemployment, congestion in housing, 
education, transport and health facilities and an overall deterioration of 
the urban enviroment.
Even when some analysts would argue that physical planning 
has nothing or very little to do with the implementation of social, 
economic and political policies, if any of those policies is implemented 
without taking into account its physical implications, it could worsen the 
existing problems. For example, some economic policies intended to 
alleviate unemployment may result in merely shifting employment from one 
area to another, giving in real terms, no job-creation, and increasing 
problems in already problematic areas, like some have argued, some of the 
"Enterprise Zones" applied in G reat Britain. The same would happen to any 
"physical" solution whose economic implications are not considered. 
Furthermore, urban policies in underdeveloped countries are im portant 
because:
"the location of new economic activities and the movement of 
population affect the efficiency of the national economy and stability of 
the political system" (Renaud,1981).
In the case of Mexico, the rapid and uncontrolled spatial 
changes that have been taking place in the last two or three decades make 
almost impossible to relegate them. The problems in large urban areas have 
grown at a level which made clear the importance of looking for a mechanism 
to solve the problems derived from this uncontrolled growth. In 1940,
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Mexico was predominantly a rural nation. Seventy percent of its population 
lived in communities of less than 2,500 inhabitants, depended on 
agriculture, and had rural ways of life. Only thirty years later, in 1970, 
the situation had changed completely, and nearly two-thirds of the 
population lived in urban communities and were part of an urban economy. 
In all likelihood, Mexico's population will grow in another thirty years, 
from 60 million in 1970 to between 120 and 150 million by the year 2000. 
Three-quarters of that population (90 million to 110 million persons) will 
live in towns and cities (Scott, 1982).
So, the magnitude of the problems made, it appeared, the 
government to recognise the need for intitutional and structural changes 
towards a balanced distribution of wealth and welfare in our country. The 
last national administrations seemed to have the political will to make 
those changes and each of them issued different projects and programmes 
aimed at providing "economic growth and a more balanced regional 
development".
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1.2. The Problems of Planning.
But while it seems that the need for physical planning has 
been accepted by the government, most of those benefits may had not yet, 
reached the population of those regions and cities that they are supossed 
to be aimed at. Despite about 40 years of planning, most of the original 
problems are still there. Concentration patterns are very high and growing 
(Scott, 1982). The levels of unemployment and subemployment have not yet 
been dimminished (Gardner, 1987), the rural-urban migration is still a 
problem (l), the capital is up until now flowing mainly to the largest 
cities (W ard, 1986; Looney, 1985). Housing and some of the services 
provided by the state can be said to be still below the norms, the 
industries have not transfered their plants and/or headquarters to those 
cities which can support them, at least in the quantities the government 
expected; and even when part of this can be attributable to a lack of 
economic resources and external economic forces, the size of the problems 
is higher than the available resources can guarantee, so, what went wrong?
It can be argued that because it was more the need for 
legitimacy than commitment w hat made planning to appear, the ultimate aim 
of those programmes and projects was not the social development of the 
country, but probably only its economic growth. Consequently, plans and 
their proposals were drawn or resulted so vague they presumibly fueled more 
concentration in already congested areas. They also were neither properly 
monitored nor implemented.
(1) Even when some studies show that for example, the natural growth of Mexico 
City is now its main cause of growth, its migration rates are still enromous.
The problems 8
The problems physical planning is facing now might therefore 
be those related with its implementation and with the concentration of 
power and decision-making. Angiotti (1987) notes that the issue of 
centralization was brought about by those advocates of the Dependency 
Theory, and argues that it might not be as "evil" as it was thought. We 
can argue that concentration may not be a problem when it means the 
adequate control of aggregate direction the country may follow. But it 
certainly is a problem when it means the benefits of national economic 
growth to be enjoyed by a minority of population in the decision-making 
centres of the country. Which unfortunately, seems to be the case in 
Mexico. Concentration brings with it a series of problems related with 
spatial desequilibrium, spatial concentration and integration (all of which 
are going to be discussed in Chapter II). It also brings with it decisions 
about political and economic control, as well as about diffusion of 
innovation. While implementation is related to the understanding of the 
reality of the areas to study, the implications of alien methods of study, 
lack of coordination and information.
All these might be exacerbated by problems derived not from 
bad planning but from the organization of government itself, which might 
allow mismanagement not to be detected on time, with the corresponding 
diversion of capital and waste of time which prevent the benefits of 
planning to get to those areas they were designated to reach.
In sum, these problems make more im portant to review the 
importance that is given to physical planning in Mexico. Down-grading its
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importance may prove to be disastrous to the long-term development of the 
country. However, not everything in physical planning is as bad as it may 
seem to be by what has been already said. Physical planning has been taken 
seriously by some politicians and planners alike, and there have been some 
achievements, but unfortunately they do not appear to be too many. The 
structure of government may be one reason why it has not emerged properly. 
This emphasizes the political connotation of planning. The solutions to 
its problems may not only be in the hands of planners themselves, but in 
those who take political decisions as well. It may also require a better 
monitoring process and mainly the introduction of the general public into 
that process. All these questions are going to be explored in the next 
chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter II
THE PROBLEMS OF CONCENTRATION
2.1. Concentration of Power and Decision-Making.
Mexico, as many other Latin American countries, has a long 
standing history of centralised power and decision-making, however, this 
process has neither been implemented with the same purposes and nor had the 
same results. In pre-Hispanic times it served mainly to have a network of 
communications between regions to organise internally their territory and 
economy. In colonial times, the reasons for centralization were completely 
different, in this case it was the need to have control over resources and 
population of the territories what was imperative, so the structure and 
economy of the country was decided from the capital city despite the needs 
of cities and regions, if this control had to be achieved. Thus they 
became totally dependant from the centre. Furthermore, "primacy was given 
to the fiscal and political needs of the mother country, rather than to 
internal development, leading to poor development of roads, communications 
and other forms of infrastructure" (Safa, 1987).
After Independance, more than 160 years ago, the situation 
did not change too much, the characteristics of central domination were 
still present. In Mexico, as well as in the rest of Latin American 
countries later, cities still had to depend from the former centres of 
decision-making in a way that prevent the designing of a proper urban 
system.
Concentration 11
The cities which were mainly favoured by being provided 
economic resources and some development investment, were mainly those ones 
useful in that already existing network of m arket cities. Still today, 
they are dependant from the centre in social, economic, political and 
therefore physical terms, because for example, the im portant and expensive 
projects may not be done if they are not designed, made and approved by 
central agencies, and simply because the money will be provided by the 
Federal government. This led towards the end of the nineteenth century, to 
the increasing primacy of the urban system -the situation in which the 
largest city is many times larger than the second largest city (Roberts, 
quoted by Safa, 1987).
Then, a pattern of concentration appeared, and the so called 
"Urban Explosion" began, which has been characterized by Castells (1973) 
with three main features, being firstly, an increasing acceleration of the 
urbanization process which creates great agglomerations in very short 
periods of time. People from the rural areas were migrating to the cities 
only to find that they were not useful to a city where the process of 
modernization has brought an increase in the levels of production in the 
industrial activities, but not as much to their needs for labour force.
Where the levels of training expected are higher than those ones these 
people can provide; thus creating secondly, huge concentrations of 
population without the productive capacity needed in the cities which 
therefore cannot be assimilated by their economic system, creating a 
complete desarticulation of their urban structure. Which leads finally to 
the third feature, a disproportionate preponderance of urban agglomeration
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in great metropolitan areas without a coherent urban network where the 
political and economic direction of the country is decided.
These factors help to increase the inequalities between 
rural and urban areas. When the rural areas lose their labour force, they 
also lose their opportunity to upgrade their situation, preventing 
potentially well-endowed areas to develop, because the big city will have 
to spend more and more every time in order to provide the minimum level of 
services needed by its increasing population, at the expense of the rural 
areas which every time found that the resources available to them are 
smaller. As well as their workforce.
But at the same time, there were some other analysts in the 
international "assistance agencies" who thought that concentration could be 
good to the developing countries because these could make the investment 
made in these areas to have higher returns because of all the advantages 
the city offers to industry and investors in general and therefore, that 
would stimulate the growth of G NP and through spread and trickle-down 
effects, the benefits will accure to the rural poor. Moreover, 
centralization was implicit in the requirements of these agencies that were 
providing large amounts of capital during 1950s and 1960s. They insisted 
that borrowers have comprehensive and long-term plans for the investment of 
external capital (Cheema and Rondinelly, 1983). This would imply that as 
population on urban areas increase, and more investment is made in them, 
higher returns would be received, and spread in higher numbers of people, 
which always will be better off because their incomes, commodities and 
general situation would be better than those in the rural areas where they
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come from.
Even so, these thoughts clearly contrast with a reality 
where concentration helped the growth of massive metropolitan areas and 
prime cities which has created serious economic and social problems. The 
largest cities in Latin America are experiencing serious housing, 
transportation, pollution, employment and service supply problems. High 
levels of underemployment among squatters and recent migrants m aintain 
these people in poverty. Difficulties in extending and maintaining 
existing sewer, water and drainage systems and utility services often 
create health and sanitation problems in densely populated squatter areas, 
and the strains on existing social, health, and educational services become 
more severe with population growth (Rondinelly, 1983).
Therefore the costs of maintaining these huge agglomerations 
would be socialy and economicaly enourmous, and most probably, impossible 
to pay. To give an example, Unikel (cited in Rondinelly, 1983 pp31-32) 
found that if "Mexico City reached a projected population of 21 million by 
1990, the national government would have to spend about $32 million (1970 
U.S. dollars), equivalent to create another G uadalajara, Mexico's second 
largest city, every year". All these, again, at the expense of the 
population of the rest of smaller cities. This is not argued to imply that 
every town in the country should have a General Hospital or Telephone 
Central. It is to emphasize that the deconcentration of the decision­
making process is needed. That at the local level, the states and cities 
should be allowed to decide by themselves, within a national framework, 
which is the best way according to their characteristics, in which
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development is to be achieved. Not an structure where two or three cities 
have all the services provided by the centre and almost nothing else is 
left to the rest.
So, it is clear th a t a policy of concentration with the 
present characteristics cannot deliver the widespread wealth tha t some 
especialists think it would create. Though there might be some benefits 
derived from concentration, like a varied supply of labour skills and the 
concentration of specialized financial and comercial services, as well as a 
strong governmental investment, they tend to favour the minority elites of 
industrialists and political hierarchies. As it was said earlier, that 
extra investment made in central cities can stop the development of 
potentially well-endowed areas. If the patterns are to be continuing, the 
social problems in Mexico City alone, would be enough to tremble the whole 
system, which is a risk no one can take.
2.1.1. Spatial Disequilibrium.
Spatial disequilibrium -accompained by social and economic 
disparities- is one of the first effects of concentration.
At the aggregate level these effects probably do not show, 
as the nation's gross domestic product of 121.3 billion dollars in 1979 
made it the world's eigtheenth largest economy, and a per capita G N P of 
$1,640 in the same year was sufficient to place it slightly ahead of North 
Korea in the group of newly industrializing countries (Looney, 1985).
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Also, Mexico became an urban country, the proportion of the national 
population living in urban areas (defined as more than 10,000 people) rose 
from 22% in 1940, to 42.3% in 1970, and in the early 1980s stood at around 
55% (Scott quoted in W ard, 1985:17)
But in 1970, the metropolitan area of Mexico City contained 
32% of the nation's industrial plants, 46% of the industrial labour force 
and 51% per cent of industrial production. In terms of population, 8.4 
million lived in the city, 38% of the nation's urban population (Unikel, 
1982). This can give us a clearer picture of the size of the problem. 
Moreover, to the interior, it could be thought that because of 
concentration, the prime city is well provided and serviced, but as its 
population grows, its interior also begin to show many deficiencies of ill- 
serviced areas, problems to find sources for its water supply, etc. As 
well as social inequalities because of, among other causes, the levels of 
migration which congest its structure. For example, even when it might be 
said that most of the people would have a regular job, the overall view is 
that the number of people looking for jobs compared to availability, makes 
them to accept lower wages than they might be earning, creating an 
enormously varied reseve army that can be used anytime the industry needs 
it. That makes people to accept substandard jobs, like for example, 
doctors with qualifications selling medical appliances. But to many of 
those migrants, the availability of jobs is almost nullified for those who 
previously arrived in the city, forcing them then, to enter what Santos 
(1975:8) calls the "lower circuit" of the city, mainly formed by low or 
unskilled family activities that can be licit or even illicit. This 
informal sector of the economy is rarely officially recorded, therefore its
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characteristics, size and problems are as well, neither recorded or taken 
into consideration when making the local plans or taking any governmental 
action. Wich might be a tremendous error because their influence in the 
city's development is crucial. Safa (1987) argues that the informal 
economy not only contributes to the survival of the urban poor, but also 
cuts down the costs of goods and services for the formal sector, and that 
labour tends to move from one to another sector regularly.
These people are normally unable to enter the "formal" 
housing market, which force them to "invade" land to form the squatters in 
the city. So, squatters begin to appear in the city's outskirts in what 
previously was agricultural land, and therefore housing and services begin 
to be needed in those areas. Public transport networks need to be expanded 
to cover them, travel-to-work time increases as people have to travel 
longer distances and to change buses several times, and over-crowding in 
public transport becomes a natural feature, increasing car ownership which 
in return creates traffic jams and pollution. Problems appear in the 
city's roads as well as their access motorways that begin to be 
insufficient for transportation of goods and people coming in and out of 
it.
As water, electricity and sewerage are needed in those newly 
created areas, the services begin to be more expensive as those extensions 
were not originally considered. The city begins to grow out of control, 
and as a consequence, planners begin just to follow that growth, instead of 
really planning it.
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This is, concentration tends to make a few cities to grow.
But they do it faster than they would normally can, thus destroying their 
possibilities of any structured growth. These changes tend to go faster 
than policies (therefore planners) can predict, making planners to look for 
answers to problems of yesterday instead of tomorrow, making planning 
obsolete. For example, as squatters -or even housing states built by 
parastatal agencies- appear, plans might be made to justify them and try  to 
alleviate the problems they might cause.
If the cities would grow only as much as their potential 
would permit, policy makers would probably be able to be ahead on their 
development.
2.1.2. Diffusion of innovation.
Prime cities have traditionally been the centres where the 
economic and political control tend to be, making these cities the place 
where private and public investment decisions are taken.
As power and investment is concentrated in those cities, 
more communication begin to be with the exterior, as multinational 
companies need to have close contact with their headquarters and national 
companies need international technology and the government needs more 
contact with the international financial and comercial centres. This makes 
as a result, the prime cities the first recipients of any technical or 
cultural innovation which enters the country. It arrives generally through
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the multinational companies if it is technical innovation, and through the 
media if it is in the form of commodities. The education centres can have 
more close relationship with other institutions abroad and share that 
innovation -through books, papers, conferences, host researchers, etc-.
It is because of its characteristics why innovation reach 
just a few cities. It is made and need to be accepted by people with urban 
life styles, ie. with certain level of income and necessity (Scott, 1982).
Thus the process of diffusion as Scott pointed out, "is frecuently cut off 
at a point only a few levels down from the largest city and initial port of 
entry." Through time, the life style of these cities become more 
international and less traditional. Which creates even stronger 
disparities between different regions of the country, on the one hand there 
might be some with all technological and cultural advantages available and 
in the other, some with little.
So if the cities are the recipients of cultural and 
technological innovation as well as political and economic power, a system 
with more cities would mean diffused political power and more awareness of 
the population about their rights, which is in itself something that may be 
against the interests of the political hierarchies. But as innovation and 
information increases in just a few cities of the country, the chances of 
having an indigenous technology decreases. If only the cities are the 
recipients of technology, those sectors of the economy and regions related 
to the growth of the agricultural sectors are left to stagnate (Scott,
1982)). The ideal would be then, to make available the use of technology 
not only to the benefit of the inhabitants of the cities. In this way, a
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new spatial system of cities may result in an effective way to filter down 
the innovation more easily to the rest of the population. To allow them to 
develop if not at par with the centre, at least not to stagnate.
In that way regions would become functionally independent 
and there would be closer contact between their rural and urban areas, 
therefore that would make them also more self-sufficient. This self- 
sufficiency would create more savings and returns to the region and the 
country in general, including those prime cities of today, because they 
will find themselves with more money to specialize their functions and not 
mainly to provide for those newly arrived. Thus creating the wide spread 
of wealth needed. It will be argued in Chapter IV that this is precisely 
what central control is stopping to happen, given the aggregate nature of 
national policies which do not allow for the local characteristics to be 
detected and strenghten.
T hat is the task of policy makers, to show the politicians 
the long-run benefits of sharing power. It will mean to share power and 
decision making with more people, but to cancel the enormous social costs 
of today's economic growth of one or two cities. The polititian's decision 
is clear, it is about social gain and political stability against 
concentrated control of resources and power in a few hands.
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2.1.3. Integration.
Integration is supposed to be the ultimate goal of any 
spatial action to be taken. Even though certain degree of centralized 
decision making may be needed, if integration is to be achieved regional 
programmes have to be implemented and the responsibility of translating 
these into actions would have to be the state governments alone. Through a 
"feed-back" or monitoring process with the states, federal government would 
be able to modify the aggregate policies. It should be a two-way process.
It has been demonstrated by experience that a totally 
centrally controlled set of policies cannot see the particularities 
involved to the regions and cities' hinterland. It is impossible to any 
central government of a country of the size of Mexico, to know and apply 
the policies needed in every mayor city in the country.
2.2. Implementation.
This is the most im portant part of any policy and probably 
the major weakness of physical planning in Mexico. If the policies cannot 
be implemented they become useless, merely a good intention, or as Unikel 
(1982) said, "an Utopian solution that fails or one that becomes a 
demagogic exercise."
This implies a great am ount of coordination at national and 
regional levels to translate those policies into strategies to be taken in
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the spatial structure of the cities. It is clear then, that if the 
conceptual and operational framework of those policies is not clear or well 
defined, or if the structure in which they operate is confused and/or 
complicated, they are going to be translated into actions which may fail in 
achieving the goals they were designed to tackle.
In Mexico, W ard (1986) argues that to serve a patronage 
system, many departments (and jobs) were created and more spending was 
made, which also gave the chance to calm down different antagonistic 
factions within the government. Therefore in this way, avoiding any chance 
for a corporate planning with an integrated approach to the problems.
So, even if later governments were commited not only to 
economic planning but to social development as well -as there problably 
were- it may have been difficult for them to try to change a system which 
originally was set up in a way that it could not work. Furthermore, as 
planning must use some instruments which were issued for purposes other 
than planning, some changes in the system had to be made, certain laws 
should have been changed and some institutional and administrative barriers 
lifted.
The problems go further, as the first plans were issued 
because of certain international pressure ("concern" some would say), they 
were most probably biased towards a system of cities working to serve more 
the external market forces than our own national interests (these 
emphasized the existing ports, and cities nearer the US border). Which 
again, may have diverted resources mainly towards those cities that already
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had them. They were scraped. Later, Mexican planners made other attem pts 
but probably using (or influenced by) models like "Growth Poles Theory" 
etc. made to work in and for the characteristics of, countries with 
different levels of development and with different social, economic and 
political circumstances to ours. Systems whose theoretical basis,
Friedmann (1987) argues, have now proved to be unsuccesful. Thus 
basically, planning has not been operating as it might. Wich may be right 
to those who would argue that all the changes needed by society would come 
anyway, because of certain "inertia" in the system would inebitably lead 
towards those changes without the need for planning. The experience 
however, have shown that governmental action should occur before these 
changes are needed, and it is too late to do anything. Therefore, dialogue 
between policy-makers and politicians is needed. This is a responsibility 
which poses institutional as well as analytical problems of integrating all 
the policy levels from the highly abstraction of national goals and 
objectives into a series of actions within the structure of the city, which 
will constitute the strategy/ies to achieve these goals.
This is something that for example, I think today's National 
Development Plan, failed to achieve, even when it postulates that a more 
rational system of cities is needed, perhaps because of political 
misunderstanding with the governors, (resulting mainly from a lack of 
coordination and communication between federal and state levels), the first 
step when making the National Plan for Urban Development and Housing was to 
declare every State's capital city as a "development pole" which led them 
to declare as such for example, two cities ten kilometres or so distant 
from each other (Puebla and Tlaxcala). This was probably because they
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thought th a t if some capitals were declared and some not, it would lead to 
implicity make some States less im portant and to depend on others to some 
resources (which is a possibility), but they did not consider that other 
cities within the same state could fulfill the role. The result was a 
series of weak policies which led to competition instead of cooperation 
between cities (see Chapter V).
In urban or regional plan making therefore, it is very 
im portant to have well defined not only the objectives, but to reach the 
best strategy as possible. This implies the understanding of the existing 
relationship between those abstract objectives and goals with the reality 
of the availability of resources, as well as the analysis of the social, 
political and administrative structure of the area. All these altogether 
will give the planner a better understanding of the area to translate these 
factors into effects th a t have to be produced in order to generate the 
changes needed.
Therefore, as there may be several barriers to plan 
implementation, attention to strategies and choice of instruments for 
translating objectives into reality are particularly crucial. This cannot 
be achieved if there is no coordination and communication between the 
different departm ents and institutions in charge or linked to the actions 
tha t are going to be carried out.
National and regional plans, up until now, do not clearly 
emphasize how the goals would be achieved, for one or another reason their 
strategies are too vague. Leaving the local planners to interpret them
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without a clear idea of w hat their intentions are. Resulting in, as said 
earlier, weak plans whose policies may produce the opposite results 
(Chapters III and V).
2.2.1. Understanding reality.
To evaluate and understand the reality of the area in which 
the policies are to be implemented, specially when the public investment 
can and have a direct impact on its development, is very im portant. In 
fact, any plan which does not contain the socio-economic analysis of the 
area will fail to achieve its goals. Because it simply will not be 
considering the reality in which it will operate. Then, the availability 
of information and its analysis, play an im portant role in choosing the 
adequate strategy. Furtherm ore, appropriate strategies imply the use of 
appropriate instruments (Chaterjee & Nijkamp, 1983). Thus the selection of 
"appropriate" or effective strategies is close related to efficient 
information-processing techniques.
Therefore, the model used to collect and analyse the 
information also plays an im portant role in plan making. This implies the 
use of one model which is open enough to consider tha t the information 
available is not always updated, or not too easy to collect, or not in high 
quantities to choose from. In contrast, some models made in developed 
countries are even made to be analysed by computers, which is something not 
all the planning departm ents have -even in developed countries!-.
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Moreover, as well as considering that the plans are going to 
operate within an existing local framework, which cannot be put aside, the 
planner must consider that those plans might operate within a regional 
framework. In other words, local plans must not only fulfill the 
requirements of the local reality but those of the context in which the 
area is. But unfortunately this may not be highly succesful in an 
enviroment where the government might have decided to give planning a small 
role in deciding the future of our cities. Which may lead some local 
planners not to consider seriously some of the social and economic aspects 
of their plans, because they think that "what is the case of doing good 
plans, if anyway they are going to be shelved without taking them into 
consideration". Creating a current of "inertia" that had surely and 
ironically, impeded some local governments commited to urban planning to 
issue succesful plans, that could make other governments to see the real 
benefits of planning and change that negative current.
2.3. Conclusion.
The effects of colonialism and distortions in the allocation 
of resources together with external pressure led to very strong patterns of 
concentration of power and decision-making to certain cities in the 
country. These, plus problems of bad management together with corruption 
in its administration and a passive role played by planners, has caused 
physical planning to face the serious problems of having weak policies, 
vague strategies and in general, a lack of consideration of the socio­
economic context in which it operates. These serious limitations have
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meant it has failed to achieve most of the goals proposed.
The position of physical planning to the political 
hierarchies seems to be now that it can only bring results if it is 
controlled by the politicians themselves. The answer then, seems to be 
that we cannot expect much from physical planning until more dialogue and 
cooperation between policy-makers and politicians is made towards the need 
of adopting a corporate structure of planning and the deconcentration of 
the decision-making process, to avoid the size of social and economic 
problems to grow to an extreme limit of no return, together with a more 
active role played by planners in the process. They need to define their 
position and act as representatives of that majority who do not have a say 
in the decisions which are going to affect them.
Chapter III
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO
3.1. Introduction.
This chapter examines the context in which physical planning 
operates in Mexico, and the governmental actions which have accentuated the 
disequilibrum patterns of the nation. It will argue first of all, tha t the 
effectiveness of physical planning has been seriously affected by the 
implementation of a series of badly-oriented economic policies, which 
combined with internal and external pressures, helped to create the right 
enviroment to tighten the central government's position. This, together 
with a web-like structured planning system, may have been used by the 
federal government to keep control of the decision-making process.
As a consequence, the central area of the country, where the 
Metropolitan Area of Mexico City lies, has been steadily increasing its 
size to begin to create a huge megalopolis with the surrounding states' 
capitals, despite the decentralization policies.
In the first part, the characteristics of growth of the 
Mexican urban system will be analysed, and the existing regional 
disparities or inequalities will be highlighted. To discuss, in the second 
part, the different approaches the government has taken to tackle the 
problems since planning was institutionalized in the 1940s and to argue why 
the policies may have failed; to finally in the third part, see the
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consequences it has brought to the regions and the role they have been 
allowed to play in planning and in the decision-making process.
3.2. Mexico's uneven growth.
Mexico is an enormous country in terms of size, population 
and availability of resources. But it is also a country of many contrasts; 
natural resources, wealth and population, are unevenly distributed.
Within Central Mexico, the valley of Mexico is the most 
heavily urbanized part of the country (Unikel, 1982). It employs 43 per 
cent of the industrial workers, 42 per cent of those in commerce, absorbs 
43 and 51 per cent respectively of the capital invested in industry and 
commerce, generates 43 per cent of the value of industrial production, and 
a similar proportion of net sales in commerce (Armstrong and Me Gee, 1985).
Nearly 20 million people now live in Mexico City. It 
overtook Buenos Aires in the 1960s to become the most populous city in 
Latin America, and overtook New York city in the 1970s to be, the premier 
city of the Americas. But this is not new to Mexico, it was the largest 
city any of the conquerors from Europe had seen, and it remained the 
largest city in the New World until the begining of the last century. 
(Blackmore and Smith, 1971)
But even when traditionally it has been a focus for 
commercial development and migration, it can be argued tha t it have been
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recent events what have really brought it to its present situation. 
Mexico, has changed much over the past 50 years. In these changes, the 
government has played an im portant role (Lavell, 1984).
The most sustained period of urban growth came during the 
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1877-1910). Rapid exploitation of the 
country's mineral resources, the development of ports and railways to link 
those ports (mainly in the gulf) with production centres in the north and 
central states -passing always invariably through Mexico City- and the 
growth of foreign trade, stimulated urban expansion in north and central 
Mexico, and accentuated the already dom inant position of Mexico City 
(Unikel in Gilbert et al. 1892).
The expansion of infrastructure during the Porfirian era was 
interrupted by the revolution of 1910, and economic growth virtually halted 
during the next two decades. Recovery began in 1933, with slow and 
unsteady growth in investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. By 1940 
the preconditions for industrial urban growth had been satisfied and World 
W ar II provided the opportunity for succesful protectionist policies that 
fostered the growth of the Mexican economy for the next thirty years (W ard, 
1986).
The rapid growth of the Mexican economy after 1940 was 
accompanied by rapid urbanization. It involved both large-scale population 
movements and the development of larger cities. The period between 1950- 
1970 has been characterized (Lavell, 1984) as having two major features. 
One, capital accumulation played an im portant role in the development
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process; the impulse of foreign capital investment; and the predominance of 
three major urban centres Mexico City, G uadalajara and Monterrey in the 
national industrial production, although the last two with a considerable 
smaller share.
Two, on the other hand, the investment in rural areas 
impulsed the development in a number of zones of commercial agriculture, 
mainly in the north of the country, which are going to provide certain 
am ount of foreign capital through exports; while in the south, the 
traditonal agricultural methods remained. This is going to make an impact 
in the overall regional development of the country. Governmental action in 
the industrialization of the country then, intensified the social, economic 
and political growth of the existing centre of decision-making as well as 
commercial agriculture in certain areas near the main commercial partner of 
the country, the USA. These are going to conform the three major 
identifiable areas in the country.
3.2.1. The regional imbalances.
The Core region sorrounding the capital, with the highest 
proportion of population and per capita incomes, is the most dense and 
urbanized region of the country.
The North is the second recognizable region. It is the one 
with the most steadly increasing levels of urbanization, agricultural and 
industrial production and overall income levels. Its close contact with
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the economy of the southern states of the USA has also m eant that its 
dependency of that economy is greater than in the rest of the country 
(Stohr, 1975). The levels of migration (specially to the Tijuana/Mexicali 
sub-region [map 3-2]) has not given some of its cities the oportunity to 
absorb all the migrants into their socio-economic structure, even when some 
of them can be catalogued as prosperous cities, the levels of urban 
unemployment and poverty are increasing (Scott, 1982).
The third zone is the south, which compared with the other 
two regions, present a picture of poverty and underemployment. The 
activities of its population are mainly agriculture-related and per capita 
income levels are the lowest in the country, despite the fact tha t from 
part of that area (Veracruz and Tabasco) is where most of the oil revenue 
come. It is also the area with the lowest levels of communications and 
urbanization (Unikel, 1976; Scott, 1982).
These regional differences can be emphasized if we compare 
migration patterns. Firstly, if we analyse metropolitan migration (map 3- 
1) we can see that although Mexico City attracts migrants from all over the 
country, most of them came primarly from the south and the surrounding 
states. This, it can be argued, is probably a cause of the high levels of 
unemployment in those areas and the living standards of the population, 
which probably finds migration as the only answer to counter-act the 
negative effects of the low investment made in their areas.
Secondly, if we see non-metropolitan migration (map 3-2) 
again, migration is not disperse, there are certain targets. G reat number
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of migrants take the north as their option and principaly the state of Baja 
California (which may be considered as a temporarly stop-over to further 
migration to the USA, with the corresponding consequences to the city of 
having a growing number of unemployed migrants.). Interestingly, in the 
south no major movements occur. It probably is simply indicating that 
being Mexico City closer, it is the first step for a migrant, even if 
he/she later might w ant to migrate to the north or USA.
Although a direct relation between the levels of 
urbanization and the development of a given area not necessarely exists, a 
study carried out by Scott (1982) showed that in Mexico, the more urbanized 
a state or city was, the higher development it had. Then, if we analyse 
the urbanization patterns we could find out another way to look for 
regional differences. M ap 3-3 shows that, by 1921 when most of the 
country's population was living in rural areas, Mexico City's area was 
already almost completely urbanized. By 1960, Mexico City remained the 
most urbanized area of the nation, while the rest of the country was 
beginning to show regional differences. This is, the northern states began 
to have their populations living more in urban than rural areas, hence, 
most probably this was showing an increase in their development levels, 
while the southern states remained mainly rural, almost no change at all 
occurred in those states. It could be argued that a division in 
development between north and south and between those and the centre of the 
country appeared. It also can be seen that an overall change towards 
urbanization ocurred between 1921 and 1960, when the industrialization of 
the country began. The country began to change rapidly.
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M ap 3-4 shows that those patterns by 1980 had only 
accentuated, showing that the "decentralization efforts" of government have 
apparently failed to change them.
If the population cartograms of 1940 and 1970 are compared 
(maps 3-5 and 3-6), these regional differences can be more clearly seen; in 
the south, no major urban centres appear in neither year -with the 
exception of Merida- or even they "disappear" like Veracruz, between 1940 
and 1950. While in the north, they steadily increased over the years their 
relative size and importance within their states. Moreover, while in Baja 
California Norte, no major urban centre existed in 1940 and it had a small 
population, by 1970 it had tripled its population and its major urban 
centres, Mexicali and Tijuana, amounted for half its population.
It can also be seen th a t urban population in the state of 
Mexico doubled it size between 1940 and 1970 together with Mexico City's, 
and more than half its population was living in the conurbation with Mexico 
City (the probable reasons for this will be discussed later on in this 
chapter).
All this is certainly in part, a reflection of the physical 
characteristics of the country, where the most mountainous and less 
accessible land is in the south, and the north is flatter, which certainly 
makes it easier for the introduction of infrastructure. But even so, that 
does not justify Mexico City's disproportionate growth and the relative low 
standards of the sorrounding area. Moreover, because of its altitude now 
for example, it is more difficult to find the water resources to meet the
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needs of its population, with the consequent enormous civil engineering 
works and expenditure needed to pump up water from lower lands, which makes 
it even more unfair to the rest of the country. Like this there are more 
examples which can exemplify the uneven share of investment made in the 
capital. In these, the government has played an im portant role. Garza 
Villareal (quoted in Bassols, 1979), said that "...the government (seems to 
be ) aware of the concentration problems but does not (seems to) know how 
to tackle it. The probable reasons for this failure will be discussed in 
the next two sections.
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3.3. Planning policies after 1940.
In the period 1940-1970 the policies for development were 
primarly concerned with the rapid industrialization of the country, 
therefore, little attention was really given to decentralization or indeed 
for an even development of the country.
Government's influence during that period was then, oriented 
principally towards capitalistic accumulation (Lavell, 1984), and gave as a 
result, in the one hand, industrialization and urban concentration, while 
in the other, differentiation of agricultural areas.
In that way, it could be said that it was an "implicit 
regional policy" towards the "economic efficiency" of the country, which 
produced the regional imbalances.
As it will be seen, in this period, some regional projects 
appeared, they were concerned with increasing agricultural production in 
certain areas like the river bassin projects, or in stimulating industry to 
settle in certain areas. However, there was not an specific programme for 
national development as a framework for those projects (Unikel, 1982; 
Lavel, 1984; Scott, 1982; W ard, 1986), therefore, they were issued without 
considering the consequences they might had in their surrounding context, 
or to the country in general.
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3.3.1. The "Regional Approach".
Although some "national" approaches were made through the 
elaboration of two six-year plans in 1933 and 1941, they really proved to 
be more an electionary platform (Shafer, 1966) than an attem pt to plan the 
development of the country.
Regions considered separately from their context then, are 
going to be the first planning attempts the government made in the period 
between 1940-1970. The most succesful of those projects were the "River 
Bassin Commissions" which were first introduced in 1947. However, some 
problems appeared because the areas for these projects were chosen with the 
same criteria the industrial development followed (Lavell, 1984), they are 
going to be implemented to increase economic growth, therefore they will be 
implemented in areas which already enjoyed some levels of development, 
adding more concentration of investment in relativelly small areas of the 
country. Stohr (1975) argues that they were implemented and controlled by 
central government, then by-passing the states' authorities. Although 
these projects did increase agricultural productivity in the regions, the 
agricultural sector in general was relegated to a subsidiary position to 
industrialization (Sanderson, 1986). The result was the increase of 
production in a few areas in the north of the country and not an overall 
increase in agricultural sufficiency and efficiency. By this time, another 
of those River Bassin Commissions was introduced aimed at industrial 
deconcentration from Mexico City, but it did little, since despite of being 
in force for 21 years, it was not even officialy accepted by the 
secretariat which was in charge of implementing it (Unikel, 1982).
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Probably only the National Border Programme achieved some 
degree of decentralization by creating some jobs on the in-bond industry in 
the border with the US. However, as it was more a political than a 
planning decision (Unikel, 1982; Scott,1982; W ard, 1986), probably as an 
effort to use the labour force intending to migrate further north, it 
resulted in its operation not being carefully planned. These in-bond 
"maquiladora" industries presumibly benefited more the US industries than 
those in the Mexican side (Lavell, 1984; W ard, 1986; Stohr, 1975) and 
increased further dependency of tha t region on the US market.
Another programme, the Guarantee and Development Fund for 
Small and Medium Industry, was aimed at promoting industrial location 
outside Mexico City. It indeed encouraged some industrial settlements in 
other places like Monterrey and G uadalajara, bu t being the State of Mexico 
not classified as an area of industrial concentration (Lavell, quoted by 
Unikel, 1982), companies could locate on it and still being in the 
M etropolitan Area of Mexico City (MAM C). This, together with the abolition 
of tax incentives to industry settling in Mexico City, which again did not 
considered the state of Mexico, fueled concentration in the MAMC.
As it can be seen, governmental programmes during this 
period even when aimed at deconcetration and social-oriented national 
growth, fueled regional differences and more concentration in some regions. 
Moreover, even when economic growth was achieved, the living standards of 
the majority of Mexicans did not seem to have improved (Bassols, 1979). 
Another feature of these policies was:
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"...a tendency to induce growth in all places at the same 
time... Rather than focusing on targets with comparative advantages that would 
make them potential counter-magnets of Mexico City, or true regional growth 
centres, spatial policy attempted to spread limited investment resources and to 
provide fiscal incentives across an undiferentiated periphery,/ (Scott,
1982:107).
It was probably the absence of an idea of a regional 
problem, despite the growing regional differences (Lavell, 1984) what made 
the government to issue those projects without considering their context. 
Thus it can be argued that the government in tha t period did not had a 
coherent "Regional Planning" approach to solve the national problems, but 
it was a series of un-related actions in different regions w hat the 
government was using as regional planning. It was probably also the result 
of only considering some economic variables like "to deconcentrate some 
activities from the city", but never a wider social intention to spread 
development. This lack of an integrated approach increased inequalities 
and therefore, the possibilities for growing social unrest. Indeed, by 
late 1960's the system was begining to show the signs of it. In 1968 the 
students' protests culminated in a massacre in October that year.
Therefore planners seemed to have failed in considering the 
context of those programmes and they did not seem to have take into account 
even their possible consequences.
3.4. Planning after 1970.
It was in 1970, when the newly-elected government of 
President Echeverria (1970-1976), first talked about "preventing the
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benefits of growth to concentrate in a few areas... and to remodel economic 
space by creating development poles" in his inaugural speech, when a 
nation-wide approach was first intended, and the benefits of Mexico City's 
growth officially cuestioned. His reasons for doing so maybe lie in the 
social unrest tha t exploded two years earlier in 1968, which m ay have made 
him to realise tha t the situation began to turn  untenable to the majority 
of population. Or in the increasing pressure from the governments of the 
states to exercise more decision-making in the issues that concerned their 
cities' hinterlands as well as their concern over the increasing 
intervention of the federal government in their internal affairs.
3.4.1. The "National Approach".
While what we called "Regional Approach" failed to provide a 
national framework to achieve real regional planning, the "national 
approach" will prove to be more part of the political discourse than a 
clear desire to widespread development. Nevertheless, the changes that 
occurred made a brake-through in the planning system.
Since 1970's then, the view of regional inequalities as a 
problem which has to be dealt with in a national context was first 
introduced. Planning is going to change radically (Lavell, 1984).
Policies were aimed to decentralize industry, promote 
regional development and reduce regional inequalities, through the 
development of a wide range of planning activities, culminating in a Human
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Settlements Law passed in 1976. W ard (1986:46) argued tha t "this created 
the basis for the state intervention in a consistent and integrated way in 
the planning of human settlements". Indeed, between 1970 and 1973, the 
government invested massively in the huge iron-plant-town of Las truchas 
and the development of the two first purpose-created tuorist towns of Can- 
Cun and Ixtapa, and in some infrastructure in Baja California. A t the same 
time, it subsidises the Programme for Agrarian Development (PID ER) and 
gives incentives to industry locating in new "Development Poles" or medium 
size cities (Lavell, 1984). A t the states' level, the government creates 
the committees for the promotion of economic development (COPRODES) with 
representation from federal ministries and states' organizations for 
development as well as representatives from private and popular sector 
groups.
Later, the administration of President Lopez Portillo (1976-
1982) consolidated planning activity within the Ministry of Human 
Settlements and Public Works (SAHOP), which was first established by 
President Echeverria's administration. Within a year, a National Urban 
Development Plan (NUDP) was published, which aimed to confront the huge 
disparities in the distribution of national population. It created a 
national framework of 11 integrated urban zones with programmes designed to 
shape efficient urban systems within each. Population centres were subject 
to policies of stimulus, consolidation or ordening and regulation 
(W ard,1986). However, regional planning was given to another recently 
created secretariat, the secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPP) who 
centralized the control of PID ER programmes and modified CO PRODES into 
state's planning organizations known as the "accords of co-operation
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between the state and federal governments" (CUC's).
As Sahop, the secretariat of National Patrimony and 
Industrial Development in 1978 published its plan, the National Plan for 
Industrial Development, which proposed an area of controlled growth around 
Mexico City, G uadalajara and Monterrey, as well as four industrial ports in 
the Pacific and G ulf (Atlantic) coasts. As there was not a national 
framework to set the guidelines, there were some differences between 
different secretariat's plans. While they did not contrasted strongly with 
the urban development plan, there were some differences in designating 
priority zones, or in the number of areas in which the country was to be 
divided. But mainly, this is going to prove the obsolecence of the urban 
plan.
The present administration of President De la M adrid (1982- 
1988) came in a moment were the discussion was centred in if the 
technocrats should be allowed a bigger say in policy making (Camp, 1985).
It was also when Mexico was suffering its worst ever economic crisis, the 
oil prices collapsed and some of the expected profits of it were already 
spent or commited. Economic recovery was imperative and the international 
institutions (IM F, World Bank etc.) were pressing on the government to open 
up its doors to foreign investment and to provide the right enviroment to 
economic growth (Safa, 1987; Urencio quoted in Armstrong and Me Gee, 1895) 
and the President himself, with an economic background, dedicated most of 
the efforts to it (W ard, 1986). Physical planning thus, did not represent 
an im portant subject.
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Soon after taking office President De la M adrid, SAHOP was 
taken its public works section off -the only one which had some money 
allocated to make up some actions- and was renamed as the Secretariat of 
U rban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), therefore it had an even more 
restricted range of operation. This time, a National Development Plan was 
first published by SPP and the sectoral plans had to follow its general 
guidelines. Sedue's National U rban Development and Housing Programme 
(N U D H P) as the previous Sahop's N UD P, divided the country into regions and 
some cities were identified as growth poles. The original number stated in 
the previous plan was reduced and some cities changed their category. The 
accords for co-operation CU C's were changed again to Unique Accord for 
Development (CUD's).
So as we can see, up until now, even when physical 
planning's national policies seem to be heading towards a better 
understanding of the way the development of the country can be achieved, 
that also had m eant firstly, a change of policies almost every six years 
(the presidential period) which is much less than the minimum time needed 
to put into operation and to see the long term results of any policy. As 
Chapm an and W alker (1987) pointed out, investment in plant and 
infrastructure, the building up of services and living enviroments, and the 
development of a labour force do not happen in five or ten years.
Secondly, during the last three administrations even when 
population and urban laws have been passed, the organizations which are 
supossed to implement them, have also changed, thus destroying the 
possibilities for any continuity on the work they have to perform, and
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probably allowing in the meantime developers and industrialists to take 
advantage for their own interests by-passing the laws.
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, these short term 
changes in policies and agencies may have weakened the implementation of 
planning instruments, because they have been accompanied by changes in the 
planning structure. Physical planning with the time has turned to be very 
complicated and confused to operate. This has restricted planning's 
ability to achieve major or substantial results. If planning is suppossed 
to be trying to make the changes the cities need to improve their 
conditions and develop, this is clearly not helping it.
Moreover, the policies encouraged companies to 
"decentralize" to the neighbouring states of Puebla, Tlaxcala, Queretaro 
and mainly Mexico, whose incentives and probably their wish to have 
investment done in their territories attracted them. The lack of co­
ordination was apparent for example when Fogain, and economic instrument of 
National Financiera (The national bank for industrial development) 
supossedly aimed at decentralization of industry, by 1976 had mainly 
financed industry located in Federal District (32%), Mexico (13.1%) and 
Puebla (4.0%) (Bassols, 1979;363). The states' capital cities began to 
make up as the satellite cities of the core D.F. where the decisions are 
taken. Then a huge megalopolis began to take shape in the central region, 
which clearly contrasts with the aims of the plans of making a rational 
decentralization.
The policies again, from the beginning may have failed to
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recognize their place in the decision-making process and the socio-economic 
context in which they were to be implemented.
Moreover, they were mainly designed to achieve widespread 
economic growth by offering stimulus and infrastructure to industry wishing 
to relocate or settle outside the M AMC, but failed to consider that some 
social investment had to be done as well. This lack of social investment 
again, could bring to a halt the social development of the nation and only 
lead to the creation of certain industrial parks or cities near the MAMC.
3.5. Planning's structure.
Mexico is a Federal Republic formed by thirty-two autonomus 
states ("free and sovereign"). Governors are the chief executives of each 
of them, and are elected for single six-year periods, the same as the 
president, although their terms do not necessarely coincide. They cannot 
be re-elected at any time.
To carry out his duties, the federal executive appoints a 
number of secretariats of state. The Secretariat of U rban Development and 
Ecology (SEDUE) is in charge of urban development matters, but as it will 
be seen, that does not mean it is the only one that can carry out physical 
planning activities.
Each federal secretariat has a representative on every 
state. These representatives (delegaciones) are there to provide
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assistance and advice to the state's authorities. Sedue's representatives 
can and do make local plans, altough by law, and given the states' 
constitutional status of autonomy, this has to be done in conjunction with 
and the aproval of, the local planning authorities. Delegations' duties 
are also to co-ordinate the actions of federal agencies of the urban 
development sector working in the state.
Sedue co-ordinates all public and semi-public sectoral 
agencies and organizations. However, these do not have to report to it, 
and nor are allocated economic resources by the secretariat. Sedue's role 
is then reduced to provide the framework in which these organizations have 
to operate, by publishing the National U rban Development and Housing 
Programme (NUDHP).
This means Sedue does not have a direct control over the 
sectoral agencies' output or activities. Each of them is working to a 
certain degree "independently", even when they have to comply with the 
N U D H P's guidelines. For example in housing. The Infonavit (National Fund 
for W orkers' Housing), can and do make its own local plans for those areas 
or cities where according to its priorities, housing for workers is needed 
or demanded. The same happens with Fovisste (Civil Servants' Housing Fund) 
and a number of other sectoral organizations. These quasi-governmental 
agencies (quangos) therefore would be carrying out housing or other 
actions, in the areas where they think are needed. But that does not mean 
they are following the proposals or priorities indicated by the N U D H P or 
indeed the local plans.
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This will therefore mean the risks of having overlapping 
between different organizations of the same sector. Moreover, they would 
be making plans and working at the local level, but not necessarely in the 
areas where investment is needed or where it is proposed by local or even 
national policies. Furthermore, other secretariats, as it was seen in the 
previous section with the example of the industrial sector, can carry out 
planning activities and also have a number of sectoral agencies working in 
the states with their outputs not being controlled. Giving as a result in 
real terms, Sedue's role and plan becoming obsolete. Physical planning may 
be carried out in the same areas, at the same time, by a num ber of 
secretariats and organizations, without really being co-ordinated. This 
can only complicate the whole process and make planning's aims to fail. 
This, while for example, economic planning is made exclusively by one 
secretariat, SPP.
As at the federal level, the state's chief executive 
appoints a number of secretariats and parastatals which are generally a 
mirror-like structure of that at the federal level. These also have a 
number of state quangos whose activities may not be controlled but by the 
executive, giving the government an extra arm which may enable it to carry 
out actions by-passing the planning system. This structure may represent a 
calculated "risk" for the government, because now this could mean the 
ability to make use of a wider number of choices all of them "carefully 
thought through" by different planning departm ents, when ever it needs them 
for its own interests or to make certain concesions because of social 
demand (W ard, 1986). A t the same time, not giving full responsibility of 
im portant decisions to an specific group of "technocrats". Therefore in
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tha t way, the decision-making process still remains in the government's 
hands.
This can be used to argue that the government is not really 
commited to planning (at least to physical planning) but it probably set it 
up because of pressures to do so. Planning is then principally 
economically orientated. The final aim most certainly is to create an 
enviroment platform sufficiently strong to attract and support foreign 
investment and the economic growth of the country, probably regardless of 
its spatial and social consequences.
3.6. The States' role.
A t the regional level, this confusing and web-like structure 
for planning, a series of biased and bad economic policies, as well as the 
central government's unwillingness to share the decision-making process, 
has led to an understandable attitude from the states' governments to 
receive with reticence anything coming from a centrally based agency. This 
has led to a lack of coordination between federal and state governments in 
implementing national policies; and may have contributed to the weakening 
of the state governments. This most certainly may have made local 
governments to ask for real devolution, in order to meet more efficiently 
the national goals as well as the state's own.
That is why the government may have conceived some other 
mechanisms to control as far as possible the development process.
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The administrative policies perhaps because of that 
pressure, have been oriented now towards improving the coordination between 
Federal and State agencies in implementing the national development 
programmes. Thus in every state a committee that includes all the federal 
agencies operating within it has been stablished. These committees are 
responsible both for linking federal activities and programmes with those 
of the state governments and for coordinating federal and state development 
efforts in each state (Ochoa, cited by Harris in Cheema & Rondinelly [ed],
1983).
But as Harris (ibidem, 1983) argues, even when the current 
administrative reforms are concerned with strenghtening the administrative 
capacity of local governments to permit decentralization of some functions 
and local participation in development projects, it has been the reluctance 
of political leaders at the centre to relinquish power and the 
underdevelopment of local government w hat have greatly unhibited such 
efforts and made real devolution rare. It has taken other subtle forms 
that he calls indirect administration and regionalization.
Regionalization has m eant the deconcentration of federal 
administrative agencies from the capital to major regional centres. While 
indirect administration has being conformed by a number of independant 
agencies(l) which act as a faster and flexible substitute of central 
ministers, as Harris argues.
(1) These are "autonomus" agencies called Parastatals or Decentralized 
Organizations which operate separate from the central government ministries but grouped by 
functional sector, and placed under the general coordination of one of the ministries.
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These agencies appear to be nothing but another way of 
centralizing the power, it may have m eant to change the restricted coverage 
of a federal ministry to a wider one of a ministry and a group of 
parastatals. It has led even to an overlaped coverage of certain aspects 
of planning. It have contributed more to the enlargement of the central 
bureaucracy than to the strenghtened of local governments.
Furtherm ore, to the regions all these changes may have only 
m eant that the traditional patterns of centralization of the decision­
making process have not been abolished, only modified into another more 
complicated one. The im portant decisions and projects which concern their 
areas, may still be taken and designed in central offices, leaving them as 
simple spectators of the planning process (Chapters IV and V). Which has 
only been exacerbated by the number of federal agencies working on their 
territories, who are responsible for many of the proposals of the local 
plans.
As W ard (1986) pointed out, these agencies working in one 
area only make up competition between bureaucratic factions instead of 
cooperation.
In plan making, some regions may even have to rely on the 
central offices' schedules as some of the local plans have to be sometimes, 
financed with central government's resources or even probably entirely made 
in central offices, because of the local office's lack of economic and 
human resources, resulting in plans that obviously are not able to consider
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in deep the local characteristics of economic and social development.
Even when some regional authorities may have succeded in 
creating relatively strong planning departments they still have sometimes 
to rely on central agencies to realise some of the proposals like housing 
or electricity or have to convince them not to do some actions, since they 
are carried out by federal organizations.
As indeed happened for example in Tlaxcala, when the local 
plan for San Pablo Apetatitlan was being made by representatives of the 
local government and Sedue(2), the area designated by the structure plan as 
ecological reserve was being built -during the elaboration of the local 
plan- with blocks for some 50 workers' flats by the Infonavit (the 
independent body dedicated to build houses for workers), which did not 
correspond with the local specifications for housing in terms of number of 
storeys and finishing materials, and without even consulting the local or 
state governments to ask at least, for planning permission. After 
discussions, the only possible thing to do was to change the policies of 
the local and structure plans and to try to estimate the impact in the area 
of such a development.
Thus it is clear that the participation of the regions in 
planning the future development of the nation has been reduced by central 
government, and what is worst, on occasions they have not even been 
entirely free to decide the development of their own cities.
(2) The author of this Dissertation was working at the time on Sedue's team 
of advisors to the State of Tlaxcala's secretariat of urban development SECODURE.
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3.7. Conclusion.
The context in which physical planning in Mexico has had to 
operate has strongly damaged its efficiency. First, its policies were 
aimed to industrialization through the attraction of investment to Mexico 
City, then policies were changed towards regionalization to reduce social 
and regional disparities. It was intended through the deconcentration of 
industry from the city, but social and regional development cannot be 
achieved through merely shifting industries to other places. Social 
investment has to be done as well, thus the policies seemed to fail to take 
into consideration their context and neither their consequences at the 
national level.
Secondly, they were proposing indiscriminated investment in 
cities without considering that the different regions needed different kind 
of investment because of their different endowements, some are prone to 
agrarian investment, etc. Thirdly, all these short time changes in 
policies have been accompanied by changes in the structure in which 
planning has to operate; which only has meant more planning bodies working 
within the regions which in turn can only complicate its efficacy and 
operation. A t the expense of the development of the regions.
Finally, it has probably been used for other purposes. It 
can prove to be efficient in supporting governmental actions and also to 
legitimize the government itself. If planning exists, it seems to be more
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because of internal and external pressures than commitment of the 
government to solve the problems. The problem then has not been the lack 
of existance of a planning system, the problem has been the way it has been 
used until today.
SECTION II 
THE CASE STUDY
Chapter IV
SETTING THE CASE STUDY
4.1. Introduction.
This chapter explains the reasons why Puebla was chosen as 
an example of the inadequacy of very centralized planning policies. It 
will use the example of the City of Puebla in the Central Region of Mexico 
to show that national policies are insufficiently sensitive to the 
differences between different parts of the country and how this can create 
a dichotomy on the social and economic aims of development. Puebla is an 
example also of how planning in local government has been forced to 
consider the immediate physical problems caused by unplanned industrial 
growth, and unable to consider the more im portant socio-economic aspects of 
development. Chapter V will develop in more deep these last arguments 
using the example of industry in Puebla.
This chapter will begin by considering the limitations of 
implementing uniform policies for economic growth. Arguing that these 
policies will improve the overall performance of the country by influencing 
growth in a small number of regions. However, it is not guaranteed that 
the benefits are going to be spread to the rest of the country. Damaging 
also the states' ability to grow by themselves, and increasing social 
problems in cities.
It will follow in the second and third sections by trying to
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show these arguments' applicability in the Central Region of Mexico. It is 
the most developed in the country, but its development has not been 
balanced. Even when industry is heavely concentrated within the region, 
agriculture remains its main activity, and per capita incomes of most of 
the states are very low compared with those of Mexico City's. Suggesting 
that apart from Mexico City, the benefits have not reached the entire area.
In Puebla, it will be argued, the same is happening, great 
discrepancies occur within the state. The State is dependent on its 
capital city. But its capital city itself depends on the federal 
government. This have made it unable to plan its development properly. 
Thus by controlling investment in the region, the federal government has 
created overall economic growth, but still the regions are depending on it. 
This last point will be discussed in this chapter's last section. It will 
be stressed that this fact has left the state being unable to consider the 
more im portant socio-economic aspects of development, but only its more 
immediate physical problems.
4.2.The Need for Different Strategies for Different Regions.
Mexico is a highly heterogeneous country. This is true at 
all spatial scales. Differences between regions are more readily apparent 
than within regions because most of the statistics are restricted to this 
level.
The process of urbanization and development is diverse.
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Each region has its own characteristics which makes it to some extent, 
unique. If different regions share the same developmental, economic and 
urbanization indicators, they do not necessarely have the same number of 
cities or the same balance between urban and rural areas. Regional 
population do not necessarely enjoy the same living standards either. 
Furthermore, policies that might be suitable for the development of one, 
are not necessarely appropriate for the others. Consequently, as different 
regions within the country may need different strategies, equally 
differentiated strategies may be required for different sub-regions. This 
cannot be done at the central level. It needs to be done by local planners 
who know the characteristics of different parts of their states. As it was 
seen on Chapter III, the fact of Mexico being so different in geographical, 
historic and politico-administrative terms, stresses this last point.
Most policies for development are intended to influence the 
development of national or regional units. One approach to development is 
to stress the performance of smaller or basic units. These smaller units 
provide the basic indicators for the performance of a region, or 
ultimately, the whole nation. If the government were looking only for 
economic growth, without considering social development, it would need to 
stress the maximum output possible (the more benefits), of the minimum 
possible of units (with the less investment). Obviously these would have 
to be those regions which already enjoy certain levels of infrastructure to 
reduce the costs of introducing it or improving it. They are definitly 
those close to Mexico City. The results will be less number of regions 
providing relatively good national performance (6.6% average GDP growth per 
annum between 1940 and 1981 [Gardner, 1987]). But within those regions it
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will most probably mean that the overall development will be given by a 
relatively small portion of them. Thus the remaining would not necessarely 
be enjoying the benefits of that growth. Thus this clearly would mean 
delaying social development in order to gain faster economic growth (or 
"economic recovery", as the government calls it).
4.2.1. Social Effects of Fast Economic Growth.
This overall performance is precisely what the Federal 
Government is more interested in. It is this w hat is going to provide the 
economic indexes for national performance the international corporations 
and institutions such as the IM F and the World Bank (see Chapter II), are 
seeking from the government. Therefore, the faster they are reached, the 
sooner investment, loans or debt re-scheduling are going to be given to the 
country. In that case, the needs for overall short-term gains are -to the 
Federal Government- justified in terms of the cash flow for development 
these institutions are going to provide for future growth.
But this development would not necessarely be enjoyed by the 
majority of population. Even when the short-run gains are definitly there 
for example in terms of industrial turnover and industrial growth 
(therefore relatively better balance of payments, some job creation etc.), 
as it was stated before, these are going to provide benefits presumably 
only for those areas where the investment was made. It is not guaranteed 
that the investment is some time going to be diverted to other non-central 
or non-metropolitan cities, nor even that the benefits are going to be
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spread evenly within those regions. Since the policies of these 
institutions are not aimed at social development, these short-term policies 
can cause stronger social problems in neglected urban areas that can 
counter act them in the long-run. This can clearly be seen in these 
institutions' requirements to cut public spending in areas such as health, 
education and housing, in order to cut down the public sector deficit 
(Safa, 1987). Moreover, implementing their policies is not a secure 
guarantee for success. After five years of implementing them (since 1982), 
in Mexico there has been no growth, investment has fallen 20% in real terms 
and real wages have been halved (G ardner, 1987). Thus increasing the 
possibilities of social unrest. Some may argue that the same kind of 
problems occured for example in the industrialization of Britain in the 
19th century, and that the results were not bad in the long-term. As it 
was said in the first chapter, that kind of argument denies all the 
historical and contextual characteristics of less developed countries.
Firstly, now there are other industrialized countries, while 
in the 19th century were not. This means competition with other countries 
which already posses the infrastructure and technology, which less 
developed nations do not share. This is translated into dependency in that 
respect. T hat dependency did not exist in the 19th. century. Secondly, 
as Sutcliffe (1971) argues, the political and social situations are 
different. Now workers are organised and powerfully demanding for jobs, at 
the time when industry uses less workers. Thus governments are now talking 
with an almost equal force; while in the 19th. century worker's needs were 
largely left without being taken into consideration. Therefore, the 
results cannot necessarely be the same. In other words, concentration of
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industry in a few places is creating social problems within and around the 
cities, which did not happened in the 19th. century. The unemployment 
figures are rising when industry do not need too much labour. Indeed, it 
is considered tha t in Mexico "more than 800,000 are coming onto the market 
annually, but few of these are being absorbed. Job creation has been 
static except in the in-bond ^maquiladora* industry along the U.S. border 
and in the northern states" (Graham , 1987). Also, the kind of output of 
industry depends much more on the needs of those countries which are 
already more developed. Increasing the patterns of dependency if the 
industrialization is not planned carefully. As Sutcliffe (1971) pointed 
out, industrialization means changes in quality. Not only quantity.
But on top of all that, this growth in only a few areas can 
stop the possibilities for the states to grow by themselves. If investment 
is comimg but it is not controled by the states directly, they will have to 
depend on the federal government for its development programmes, and there 
is no assurance it will be used in key areas.
One way to avoid these problems would be then, according to 
specific regional needs, to provide the investment in the sectors of the 
state's economy and places of the country where it is needed to spread its 
benefits and provide a more secure base for growth. T hat cannot be done 
entirely from the centre. National policies need to be guided according to 
the results in specific regions. It is a continual process, not a static 
one.
In sum, fast economic growth if it is not carefuly planned,
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can create the conditions for social problems to arise due to for example, 
industrial concentration in few areas. It may also lead other im portant 
sectors of the economy like agriculture, to stagnate. Finally, it can 
create more dependent states which will not be able to be self-sufficient 
in economic crisis. These possibilities will be explored in the next 
sections of this chapter.
4.3. Defining the Central Region in Mexico.
It is difficult to identify totally homogeneous sub-regions.
This is stressed by the fact of different attempts in Mexico being made by 
different institutions have outcomed different regionalizations. But most 
of them identify a core or central region, which is formed by the Federal 
District (D.F.) and its sorrounding states of Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, 
Puebla, Queretaro, and Tlaxcala. (map 4-1).
For the purposes of this study, the Central Region will be 
considered as being formed by the states which most authors identify, which 
gives us the advantage of being a region relatively small in number of 
units, and with a relatively good availability of information. It is a 
diverse region but with the sufficient coherence in terms of availability 
of infrastructure, industry, motorways, population, etc. to be considered 
as a planning unit.
The State of Puebla in the Central Region was chosen because 
it is considered to be a clear example of what was discussed previously.
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It is in the region with the heaviest investment in the country, and it is 
also where the social conditions of its inhabitants have the biggest 
disparities. The Central Region is the region with the best indices of 
economic growth, but this is more a reflection of the presence of the 
Federal District than of an evenly developed and prosperous region. As an 
example, Tlaxcala and the D.F. are considered as part of it. Tlaxcala has 
the lowest per capita income in the country (584.0 Mexican Pesos in 1970), 
while Mexico City has the highest (43,199.1 Mexican Pesos) (tables 4-3 and 
4-6 below).
There is no doubt tha t the whole region is dominated by 
Mexico City. It is the capital city the one which provides most of the 
advantages the region has in economic terms. Therefore a subdivision could 
be helpful to understand its characteristics. The D.F. and the State of 
Mexico make-up the core of the whole region. It is there where the 
heaviest concentration of industry and infrastructure are; also, some 
municipalities of the State of Mexico conform a physical unit with the 
D.F.. The other sub-regions that can be identified are: Sub-region Centre- 
East formed by Puebla, Tlaxcala and Hidalgo; the city of Puebla in the 
state of the same name being its regional centre. Sub-region Centre-West 
is the third one and it is formed by the States of Queretaro and Morelos, 
being the city of Queretaro the one associated as its regional capital.
Here, it is im portant to emphasize the fact that those 
capitals' influence do not necessarily end with or are constrained by the 
boundaries of their subregion -or even region- such as Puebla, whose 
influence goes beyond the boundaries of the central region.
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4.3.1. Characteristics of the Central Region.
The central region with 99,000 Km2 covers 5 percent of the 
National Territory of Mexico, but in 1980 contained 35 percent of its 
population (27.8m), with a density of 252.17 inhabitants per square 
kilometre. The population of the area covered by the D.F. and the State of 
Mexico alone (17.5m) make up over 20 percent of the national total, with 
only 0.4% of the national area (23,000 Km2 ), it has a huge density of 7,266 
inhabitants per square kilometre (Comision de Conurbacion del Centro, 
1985).
It is the most densely populated area in Mexico and more 
than 70 percent of the population is urbanized (Scott, 1982). Despite the 
urban nature of the central region however, agriculture remained the source 
of livelihood for much of its population, accounting for more than half of 
all employment in Hidalgo and Tlaxcala. Agricultural productivity was 
generally high. However, it was manufacturing commerce and service 
activities of the central region which distinguished it from the rest of 
the country. For example, the proportion of the GNP in manufacturing of
Table 4-1
Evolution of Regional Distribution of GNP in Manufacturing 1950-1984. (In percentage)
Region 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1984
Central Region 44 49 51 53 55 56
Rest of the 
country.
56 51 49 47 45 44
National Total 18.0 32.7 75.2 109.4 152.8 153.9
Note: National Totals are given in millions of 1960 Mexican Pesos.
Source: Programa de Ordenacion territorial de la Region Centro del Pais.
Comision de Conurbacion del Centro del Pais. Mexico* 1985.
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the Central Region has been steadely increasing since 1950 when stood at 
44% , up to a 56% in 1984 (table 4-1), which means more than half the total 
G N P in manufacturing being generated in only 5% of the territory of the 
country.
One might expect given these conditions the per capita 
income would be also high, but this is true only for the Federal District 
(see table 4-5). The rest of the states -Puebla included- had relatively 
low income levels and uneven patterns of income distribution. Moreover, 
most of the proportion G N P in manufacturing in the central region was 
generated by the MAMC. An average of 82% of it. The rest of states in the 
central region having a share of around 10% of the national proportion, 
which represents about 19% of tha t of the region (table 4-2).
Unikel's national division of eight regions puts the central 
region (again, without considering the D.F. and the State of Mexico) in 
seventh place in GD P per capita generation relative to the whole country, 
with Puebla occupying fifth place among the region. Although, if the
Table 4-2
Central Region Distribution of GNP in manufacturing 1950-1984. (In precentage)
Region 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1984
MAMC 55 (79) 40 (82) 42 (82) 45 (85) 42 (93) 43 (76)
Rest of
Central Region. 9 (21) 9 (18) 9 (18) 8 (15) 13 (17) 13 (24)
National Total 7.92 16.0 38.3 57.9 84.04 86.1
Notes: Totals are given in millions of 1960 Mexican Pesos
The numbers in parentheses indicate the proportion within the central region>
while the others are national proportion of GDP.
Source: Programa de Ordenacion territorial de la Region Centro del Pais. Comision de
Conurbacion del Centro del Pais. Mexico> 1985.
Characteristics of the central Region 70
region were considered together with the D.F. it goes up to the very first 
place (table 4-3). This, rather than the relative favourable nature of the 
aggregate indexes, revealed the region's umbalance and contrasts in 
development.
4.4. The City of Puebla.
The city of Puebla is the indisputed centre of the Centre- 
East Sub-Region. A densely populated and generally poor sub-region, 
characterised by being dedicated mainly to agriculture.
Table 4-3
Mexico. GDP per capita by regions and slale> 1970. (In 1950 Mexican Pesos.)
State/Region GDP 
per capita
Rank
Nationaly
Rank within 
the region
Country 3,104
Region I 4,098 (2)
Region II 4,015 (3)
Region III 2,871 (4)
Region IV 1,330 (6)
Region V 1,693 (5)
Region VI 1,296 (7)
Hidalgo 1,021 29 6
Morelos 1,901 17 3
Puebla 1,276 25 5
Queretaro 1,655 22 4
Tlaxcala 871 31 7
Region VII 5,965 (1)
Federal District 7,804 1 1
Mexico 2,728 11 2
Region VIII 1,247 (8)
Note: Ranks in parentheses indicate region's* while the others indicate the
state's
Source: Unikel, 1976 Table VI-I pl79.
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However, the city of Puebla enjoys several advantages for 
being relatively close to the D .F .. Transport flows revealed the pattern 
of economic interaction. Rail traffic suggested the importance of Puebla 
as both, the door to the capital and as a distributor of goods to the south 
of the country (Scott, 1982). Rail traffic is overshadowed by the road 
transport system, reflected in the short journey between Mexico City and 
the city of Puebla: only two hours (they are 127 km away)
When vehicles-trips per week are considered, a 
disproportionate number of trips are revealed to be made between Mexico 
City and the city of Puebla. A bout ten times more compared to those which 
come from the south of the country. Additionally, a survey made by Unikel 
(1976) showed that Puebla, unlike the rest of the capitals in the central 
region, works as the centre of a smaller network of cities if its traffic 
flows are considered. This emphasizes the strong relationship existing 
between Mexico City and Puebla. It can also suggest a flow of materials 
from and to the south of the country using Puebla as some sort of 
distributor or production centre of goods. As well as a flow of people and 
services from Mexico City.
4.4.1. Puebla's Growth.
Puebla is the fourth largest city in the country, with a 
population in 1970 (considering its whole conurbation) of well over one 
million. Within the central region, only Mexico City is bigger. It was
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made-up in 1960 of 9 municipalities. Because of its position near the 
boundaries between the state of Puebla and Tlaxcala, three of those 
municipalities belong to the neighbouring State of Tlaxcala. In 1960-70 it 
had an annual increase of 4.4 percent in its urban population, which was 
slightly higher than the national growth of 4.2 percent in urban population 
(Armstrong, McGee, 1985:69). Its annual compound growth rate between 1940- 
1970 of 4.4 percent is the third largest in the Central Region; in the 
decade 1960-1970 that rate was 6% , compared with the State's growth in the 
same period of 4%. Its 92% of urban population is 22% of the state of 
Puebla's total urbanized population, and more than 5% of that of the Nation 
(Unikel, 1976), which makes it the third largest growing and urbanized state 
and second largest city in the Central Region. Compared with being the 
fifth State and fourth city respectively within the country.
The state had in 1970 63% of its population working in the 
prim ary sector, with employment in manufacturing of about 19%. The city of 
Puebla's numbers were completely different, with only 6% employed in the 
prim ary sector and almost 30% in m anufacturing (Scott, 1982). It is a city 
whose activities then, differ completely from those of its hinterland. In 
1980, the State of Puebla had 13% of the total Economic Active Population 
(EAP) of the central region. (Comision de Conurbacion del Centro, 1985). 
This, together with the infrastructure which links it to Mexico City, has 
made it a target for industrial location. As it can be seen for example, 
in the fact that after the opening of the motorway in 1962, and before 
1970, fifteen out of the twenty-four major firms in the State of Puebla, 
have settled near the city around the motorway, and seven in Puebla's own 
municipality (Mele,1986).
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4.4.2. The Size of Federal Investment.
It would be expected for the State of Puebla to receive a 
great share of federal investment through for example, regional programmes 
for development, accordingly to its size and activities. But this is not 
the case, within the Central Region, all states between 1959 and 1970 saw 
their share to decline or stay at 1960's levels. Puebla's was halved from 
3.32% to 1.62 percent (Scott, 1982:table 3-27 p i 12). This decrease is 
aggravated by the fact that 70% of the state funds come from federal 
sources (table 4-4). In fact, the Federal District was the only city/state 
whose share of federal investment increased from 12.91% in 1954 to 29.03% 
in 1970, with a peak in 1968 of 44%. Although this is probably due to the 
1968 Olympic Games staged in Mexico City that year.
Additionally, the very fact of the city of Puebla being in a 
state whose inhabitants' main activity -therefore income- is related to the 
prim ary sector, makes it to expect a relative small income from the State 
government; what makes it then, more dependant on the federal government 
for its development resources.
On the other hand, as it is going to be argued in Chapter V, 
federal investment in the state has been traditionally aimed at alleviating 
the problems of and providing benefits to Mexico City through creating 
regional infrastructure such as the motorway, rail line, gas pipeline, 
electricity, high tension line etc. The government has invested in
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infrastructure to alleviate the problems of Mexico City, which has 
coincidentally influenced Puebla's industrial growth. This investment was 
not made with Puebla's development in mind, nor was it consulted. Thus not 
giving the state or the city's planners a role in neither deciding where 
and when the investment should be done or about the sectors of its economy 
which needed to be invested on to balance this growth.
Then, at the same time that the federal government is 
affecting indirectly Puebla's development, it is reducing the federal 
proportion of direct investment in the State (from 3.3% to 1.6%). This is 
worst if it is considered that the federal government assigns only 10% of
Table 4-4.
Origin In percentage of the Funds of the State of Puebla. 1980-1986
CONCEPT 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
a. Origin of Funds * St X X * X St
Taxes 7.698 3.755 4.756 2.596 1.805 1.851 1.697
Duties 4.481 2.094 7.177 2.039 3.454 1.652 4.169
Capital gains .430 .761 2.700 .460 1.070 4.097 .568
Products 1.551 .813 .900 .754 .722 .679 .629
Federal participation 62.367 72.724 69.793 74.987 70.620 79.747 70.400
Extraordinary 16.345 12.651 10.279 11.938 9.824 4.234 12.483
Sub-Total a = 92.872 92.798 95.605 92.774 87.495 92.255 89.946
b. Cash and values. % X X X X St St
Cash .488 1.038 .450 .267 .612 .961 .790
Temporary Stock Deposits 6.640 6.164 3.945 6.959 11.893 6.784 9.264
Sub-Total b = 7.128 7.202 4.395 7.226 12.505 7.745 10.054
C«)
TOTAL ta+b) 3.481 5,778 8.220 18.679 32.683 43,149 74,396
Notes: Totals (a + b) are given In millions of Mexican Pesos.
(»): The sudden Increase In the amount from this year Is due to the 1982 devaluation of the peso. 
Source: Estados de orlgen y apllcaclon de fondos del Estado.
Estado de Puebla.
The Size of Federal Investment 75
its budget to all state and municipal budgets (Harris in Cheema and 
Rondinelly [ed], 1983) and that Mexico City's budget is higher than those 
of all states in the country together (Bassols, 1979).
Moreover, the proportion of the State's funds which is spent 
towards covering the costs of the urban growth of its main city is 
enormous, and does not allow the state government to cover correctly the 
needs of the rest of its cities and population's main activities which are 
related to the primary sector. Together with this, as said earlier, the 
proportion of federal aportation on the state's funds is increasing every 
year, to be up to an enourmous 70% in 1986. The implications of this are 
among others, that the central government can decide by turning down or 
approving the state's annual budget, the sectors of its economy and 
projects in which the State can invest or not.
Indeed, as it can be seen in table 4-4, in the period 1980- 
1986, its percentage of incomes through local taxes has decreased from 7.7% 
to a mere 1.7%; while the federal portion has grown from 62.3% to a 70.4%, 
having a peak of almost 75% in 1983, which represents a 13% increase in 
only six years, while the reduction in local taxes represents a loss of 
almost 80% in tha t item alone. Moreover, it is opportune to remember that 
in real terms, the federal aportation has been decreasing, which means even 
heavier dependency on the federal government to carry out im portant 
development projects, since the State has less money in real terms to 
spend. A t the time when inflation rates are at about 100% or more per 
annum.
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4.4.3. Uneven distribution of Benefits.
Additionally, as it can be seen in table 4-5, the use as a 
percentage of the funds to agriculture and forrestry has decreased from 
nearly 0.9% to 0.7%. "Human Settlements" is an item which represents 
investment made towards urban public works such as the introduction of 
sewerage, piped water, pavements etc. which surely the city of Puebla's 
conurbated municipalities will largely consume, altough it has also
Table 4-5.
Application In percentage of the State Government's Funds. 1980-1986.
CONCEPT 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
a. Sectoral Application X * X X * X X
Agriculture and Forrestry. .890 .934 1.094 1.386 1.379 1.084 .681
Fisheries. - .034 .060 .026 .039 .064 .026
Industry and Crafts. 1.292 1.038 .802 .728 .602 .727 .752
Communications and Transport. 5.142 3.928 4.781 5.107 9.904 2.336 1.949
Commerce. - .069 .060 .069 .204 .027 -
Turlsm. .086 .121 .133 .139 .082 .159 .153
Human Settlements. 19.448 16.857 12.347 13.501 16.748 15.518 15.967
Education, Science and Tech. 30.422 27.258 30.291 21.575 18.446 21.550 19.467
Health and Soc. Security. 2.556 6.005 6.788 3.586 6.254 7.789 6.411
Labour. .229 .207 .291 .192 .244 .289 .207
Admlnlstratlon. 30.077 48.407 46.654 33.294 41.002 48.370 39.118
Sub-Total of Sectors = 90.142 104.858 103.301 79.603 94.904 97.917 80.729
After Increase or Dlmmlnutlon
due to credits.
Sub-Total a = 88.074 93.730 83.581 78.126 89.773 81.662 92.765
b. Cash and Values. X X X X X X X
Cash. 1.728 .646 .617 1.076 1.278 1.371 .359
Temporary Stock Deposits 10.198 5.624 15.802 20.798 8.949 15.967 6.876
Sub-Total b = 11.926 6.270 16.419 21.874 10.227 17.338 7.235
TOTAL Ca+b) 3,481 5,778 8,220 18,679 32,683 43,149 74,396
Notes: Totals Ca+b) are given In millions of Mexican Pesos.
(.): The sudden Increase In the amount from this year Is due to the 1982 devaluation of the peso. 
Source: Estados de orlgen y apllcaclon de fondos del Estado.
Estado de Puebla.
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decreased from 19% in 1980 to 15% in 1986. In fact, in the period 
considered, the only item which shows an increase is adm inistration, which 
can be seen as a reflection of the increase in bureaucracy at the expense 
of other items. All this can be used to reaffirm Harris's arguments that:
"A vicious circle of administrative underdevelopment and fiscal 
poverty exists among local governments in Latin America. Because of their 
lack of financial resources, local governments have difficulty covering their 
basic operating expenses... Their limited funds make it impossible for them 
to improve their administrative capacity. Their limited administrative 
capacity in turn discourages the allocation of new functions... Finally, 
their limited administrative capacity greatly hinders their ability to levy 
and collect taxes, or mobilize their own sources of revenue." (Harris, in 
Cheema and Rondinelly 1983).
The use of less than 1 % in agriculture together with more 
tha t 35% in administration and 15% on urban m atters in a state whose main 
activities are related to the prim ary sector and with 56% of its population 
living in rural areas, indicates the distorted priorities and may reflect 
that its main city is consuming most of its funds. Forcing the State to
Table 4-6
Relative Urbanization and Agricultural Development by State. 1970
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Morelos 17 7 18 24 31 1,572.8 2.062 70
Puebla 19 21 25 30 27 4,877.8 0.620 47
Mexico 12 12 23 29 30 7,221.1 3.645 62
Tlaxcala 21 29 26 27 11 584.0 0.234 50
Hidalgo 23 24 27 24 25 2,558.0 0.529 28
Queretaro 11 11 11 17 18 973.0 1.609 36
Federal District 22 2 15 6 32 43.199.1 8.816 97
Note: Column definitions:
1 . Ranking of relation between capital and production.
2. " •• " " " cultivable hectares.
3. " •• •• ” " labour.
4 . ■■ " " value of production and labour.
5. » •• •• cultivable hectares and labour.
6. Per Capita Income estimate (1970 pesos)
7. State development Index.
8. Percentage of urbanization.
Sources Scott, 1 9 8 2  table 5-3 P 2 1 0 - 2 1 1
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depend heavely on federal programmes for development such as CU D (The 
Agreement for Development) or PID ER  (Programme for Rural Development), to 
fund the agricultural sector of its economy. Therefore deep abnormalities 
in the distribution of the funds exist. It reflects also that 
concentration is very evident in the State of Puebla. But is this economy 
of agglomeration creating a generalised upgrading of the living standards 
of the whole population? The answer unfortunately appears to be not.
Despite the presence of a large industrialized urban area, 
the benefits of urban industrial growth do not appear to have reached the 
rural areas. The State of Puebla has the third best income per capita in 
the region, which is the fifth best out of the thirty-two States in the 
country. But its development index (1) is the fifth in the region and only 
twenty-fourth in the country. In terms of capital investment per 
agricultural worker for example, Puebla ranked twenty-fifth out of thirty- 
two states. In terms of labour productivity, it ranked thirtieth (table 4- 
6). This then, clearly shows that as Mexico City in the Central Region, in 
the State of Puebla, the city of Puebla is making the whole state's 
performance seem to be good while hiding discrepancies within the state.
(1) A composite index developed by Unikel and Victoria (cited by Scott, 
1982:204). The variables of the index are: (a) state product per capita; (b) industrial 
output as a percentage of state product; (c)industrial employment as a percentage of total 
employment; (d) capital investment in agriculture; (e) irrigated area as a percentage of 
cultivated area; (f) electricity consumpsion per capita; (g) gasoline consumption per 
capita; (h) infant mortality per 1,000 live births; (i) sugar consumption per capita; (j) 
percentage of houses with water; (k) percentage of population with shoes; and (1) 
literacy.
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4.5. Federal Control of the local economy.
Territorial concentration was forcing the federal government 
to assign a growing volume of resources in order to cope with the problems 
of the functioning of the capital city. This led the government to began 
to think in the benefits of deconcentration policies.
Puebla can be used as an example that the federal 
government's action was then, to create "deconcentration" in areas where it 
could still have control of the economy. In this way, federal government 
could be implementing "deconcentration" policies, and at the same time, it 
could avoid the problems of sharing decision-making with other areas or 
groups (at the same time when it sounds like the government is really 
sharing the power). This, they might say, in order to preserve the 
"efficiency" of the political system.
Industry began to arrive in Puebla in 1960's, after the 
government had made investments in regional infrastructure. But even if 
the government did not encourage industries to settle there, the city of 
Puebla was likely to experience an accelerated growth given its size, 
infrastructure characteristics and geographical position (2). Together 
with regional infrastructure, the control of the State's economy can be 
exercised through the control of the state's funds. If federal government 
has control over the budget, they can be sure that the city or state
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planning departments cannot decide freely how to spend it and have to 
consult them for major projects.
The results can be firstly, tha t major projects have to be 
carried out under federal supervision or being made entirely through 
central government's apointees because the resources have to be aproved by 
central agencies. They have to be aproved for example, through the States' 
Development Planning Commission (COPLADE) which is chaired by federal 
officials from the Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPP). 
Secondly, the federal government can influence the kind of projects being 
carried out, therefore their output. If the project does not appear as a 
national priority to be carried out in the state, then it will be refused.
The priorities are set at the SPP's central headquarters without any 
previous input from the state. So every year, the Coplade and officials of 
the state government meet to decide what can or cannot be carried out.
This has led to some state planners to propose every year actions that the 
federal government would approve, instead of proposing the actions that the 
state think must be done. Then, one obvious repercusion is that the 
development of the state, will be partly decided from the centre.
4.5.1. Immediate solutions instead of Planning.
This can leave the State unable to consider but its most 
urgent physical problems. The state of Puebla, having 70.4% of its funds
(2) For example, Lavell reported that few if any of a group of 
entrepreneurs in the state of Puebla, Guanajuato, Queretaro and Morelos, accorded much 
significance to the tax exemption laws in their own location decisions (Scott, 1982; 108).
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coming from federal sources (see table 4-4 above), has to put the most 
urgent matters on its budget. These mostly refer to the growing and urgent 
problems of its enourmous capital city, relegating the rest of the state to 
a second place. Maybe trying to find another kinds of federal sources for 
it. This can be partially reflected in its less than one percent dedicated 
to agricultural matters against almost twenty percent to urban issues (see 
table 4-4). This in a state where in 1970 56% of its Economically Active 
Population (EAP) was employed in agriculture with only 14% of its EAP 
employed in manufacturing. While as said earlier, the City of Puebla has 
6% of its EAP employed in agriculture and almost 30% in manufacturing. 
State planners cannot then, appropriately think in the future development 
of the state, but in the actual consequences of a concentrated industrial 
development in the capital and its surroundings. Their plans will tend to 
reflect this pattern by proposing strategies accordingly with what already 
is happening in the cities. Like for example proposing housing areas where 
is known by them the federal agencies are to built some houses, instead of 
influencing the actual decision(3). This might make to possible good long- 
run federal programmes not to be carried out because of priorities set at 
the local level impede to. Local governments may see urgent short-term 
issues as the first priority. Or programmes that are unmatched because of 
the same reason between the state's government and its municipalities.
An example of this happened in early 1986, when the
(3) These happened in the example used in Chapter II when the planners in 
the state of Tlaxcala were not consulted by the federal agency which was building houses 
in an area considered as important for historic and conservation reasons. The plan which 
was being elaborated at the time, had to put the area as a housing reserve.
(4) These meetings took place alternatively in each state, between January 
and April, 1986. The author of this Dissertation assisted acting as Sedue's adviser to 
the State of Tlaxcala.
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Secretariat of U rban Development and Ecology (Sedue) tried to put in the 
negotiation's table a long-term regional programme for the conurbated area 
of Puebla-Tlaxcala(4). Nothing was agreed after a few months because both 
governments' planning officials were too used to federal programmes which 
are inoperative, they did not think another regional programme could make 
any difference. They instead had, as their own priorities, set a num ber of 
partial plans in certain areas of the conurbation (Puebla) or even in other 
regions (Tlaxcala). In that way, those plans would be looking for 
advantages of justifying federal investment, instead of solutions to the 
problems in the conurbation. A chance was lost in one of the few 
opportunities when the federal government was really looking for solutions. 
This could have been avoided if as it is going to be argued in the next 
chapter, the local authorities were consulted and their priorities set in 
the policies before the problems were created in the first place. This is 
a seriuos consequence of the lack of integration between the economic 
targets for industrial growth and the social factors of development. Still 
today, economic development seems to be given priority over social issues.
To some extent, the problems facing Puebla, are due to the 
Federal Government's stubborn stand towards centralization. Its policies 
have reflected its position, thus, on the basis of a rapid economic growth, 
the differences between regions of the country have not been taken into 
account, making a number of cities or areas with different endowments in 
each state, to receive the same industrial policies. These uniform 
policies have created that, as in the State of Puebla, only a few areas and 
population receive their benefits.
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Then, assuming the rest of States in the Central Region have 
been receiving industry as Puebla, National Policies only have affected 
regions or localities which already possesed certain conditions for 
development (infrastructure, services, labour, etc.). These were 
principally the ones closer to the centre, which was the catalyst for this 
growth to happen. The remaining areas within the state were largely 
ignored by these overall policies for development. Thus increasing 
discrepancies within the state. Moreover, these policies did create some 
industrial development, but this has benefited presumably more the core 
than the recipient areas.
Chapter V 
THE LIMITS OF PHYSICAL PLANNING.
5.1. Introduction.
Focusing on industrial policy, this chapter develops the 
discussion about the problems and limits of Physical Planning in Mexico by 
analysing the example of Puebla. The chapter is divided into three parts, 
each discussing a different aspect of planning practice in Puebla.
The first part analyses the system itself and how it 
influences planning's output. It argues that the consequences of 
separating economic from spatial planning, may be unbalanced and distorted 
policies for development. This is emphasized by a political system which 
stresses concentration of decision making in the federal government over 
the state and municipalities, probably as a means to control the 
"efficiency" of the system. The result, however, is a failure to give 
proper attention to local needs. It is also argued that the regional 
policies of each of the last three presidential administrations have been 
so weak tha t the states have tried to take advantage of them 
indiscriminately. This will ultimately produce further concentration 
because the states nearer the centre are best endowed to attract industry. 
This may be what the federal government wanted anyway, since all policies 
seem to give priority to national economic growth of the country over 
balanced regional and social development.
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The second part of the chapter deals with industry as a 
means of achieving development. It is argued tha t it is such a national 
priority, planners seem to have forgotten to find alternative policies 
according to the characteristics of each region. Planners have stressed 
only industrial growth in the central region of the country and avoided 
other well endowed parts of the country and/or sectors of the economy. This 
has reinforced the economic and political power of the centre.
In part III, the chapter looks at the role spatial planning 
has played in the industrialization process of the state and city of 
Puebla, arguing that even though it appeared relatively early in the state, 
it has not promoted development or provided a reliable instrument to be 
taken into consideration by different sectors of society. Then missing an 
opportunity to participate actively in the process.
PART I
ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING SYSTEM
5.2. The Scope of Urbanization Policy.
In Mexico there exists a split between policies for Urban 
and Regional development. It is as if city and region were two separate 
things in the development of the nation. This is reflected in the 
institutional structure of the Federal Government (see chapter three) where 
the responsibility for regional planning is given to the Secretariat of 
Programming and Budgeting (SPP). Its responsibility for making the 
National Development Plan (NDP) gives it the task of setting national goals 
for the period of one presidential administration (six years). U rban 
policy is centred in the Secretariat of U rban Development and Ecology 
(Sedue), who according to the ND P's guidelines has to set the spatial 
development of the nation through the National Programme of Urban 
Development and Housing. The staff of the SPP consists mainly of 
economists who take regional planning as a branch of applied economics and 
are primarly concerned with promoting the economic development of the 
nation. Sedue is staffed mainly by architects who think they have a clear 
concept of what a city must be and how its functions relate to each other.
However, urban and regional development processes are not as 
radically different as this implies. As was argued in chapters one and two, 
regional planners should consider the spatial interrelations between cities 
and regions and the effect their policies might have on their spatial
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structure, so as to avoid producing uneven and distorted patterns of 
regional development. On the other hand, urban planners should really take 
into account the socio-economic structure and characteristics of cities or 
areas they are planning to fully understand the mechanisms that make them 
change. This might enable them to propose more realistic policies.
Planners seem to have ignored these aspects when making 
their plans. There may be a number of reasons for this,including the 
following:
1. There is no real commitment to urban planning. Planners 
may have been disappointed of the low capacity planning has in the present 
governmental structure for making real changes. This has driven them to 
consider planning as an activity which offers little rewards in the sense
of personal achievement. Consequently, a number of urban planners (who in 
most cases are Architects) have viewed planning as a part-time activity and 
taken some architectural projects on a regular basis maybe as a practice to 
achieve those rewards. It is also common for planners to leave the 
secretariat after three or four years for a better job elsewhere, or to 
practice privately.
2. There is commitment but not experience. Rapid staff 
turnover has led to some planners without experience being appointed to 
posts with responsibilities beyond their capacity. Unfortunately, if point 
one applies, they when they have got that experience, is when they begin to 
think in changing to another job.
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I think these first two points occur in middle-range posts.
In junior posts (senior posts are discussed in a latter section of this 
chapter), things are slightly different:
3. The school of planning. Some recent graduates may want 
to have experience before they get another (probably better paid) job. In 
the public sector the salaries for relatively low posts do not correspond 
to the decisions taken (Sedue in particular has the lowest for planners), 
therefore few of these posts are taken by experienced planners. This makes 
these post to be taken-up mainly by recent graduates. This also, make the 
graduates to try to assimilate as much experience as possible in the 
shortest period of time, before going to the private sector or a better 
paid job in another secretariat. This makes sometimes very talented people 
to leave the secretariat, again, after having enough experience to take 
decisions, because they feel they are "under-valued" by the secretariat. 
(The salaries within the public sector are set by SPP, the full 
implications of Sedue having the lowest salaries will be discussed in a 
latter section).
These may be some of the reasons why the plans are not 
carried out properly and do not consider all the socio-economic aspects of 
development. There are other im portant reasons tha t relate to the way 
plans are made. Officially, it is a task local authorities (state and 
municipalities) must carry out. Therefore, when some of them are made in 
central offices, planners do not have enough knowledge of the 
characteristics of the cities or regions. It is difficult to go directly 
to the areas as travel allowances are limited. Then, some information has
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to be obtained by phoning-up local authorities (or the secretariat's 
delegates in the states), who w ant central planners to come not to phone-in 
to them. Or they are made with information based on out-dated programmes 
or photographs. Moreover, most plans of major cities were completed in 
late 1970s or early 1980s, and are now out of date, but some local 
authorities do not have the money, the time, the staff and/or the priority 
to carry out revisions.
Another problem is that most urban planners are architects, 
and until recently, architects were not properly thought to understand the 
economic and social aspects of development. It was difficult to ask them 
to do it when they lacked the skills. The same must happen in SPP, where 
economists have not thought serioulsly about the spatial dimension of the 
problems in the cities and regions and how their relate to each other.
5.3. The divisions between Economic and Spatial Policies.
The first problem arising from this artificial 
differentiation is that the NDP is set without any input from Sedue. It 
lacks w hat Friedmann (1973) calls "spatial economics", in which the 
economic targets are set within a spatial framework which enables them to 
be translated into a defined and organised set of activities in cities and 
regions. Avoiding this can produce discrepancies between economic and 
spatial policies.
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5.3.1. The consequences at the National Level.
National economic policies aim to improve the overall 
performance of the country (industrial output, G D P, unemployment rates 
etc.) through the settlement of national priorities and allocating 
resources to strategic parts of the economy. Sectoral policies then try to 
design specific projects and programmes to meet the targets set at the 
global level (Friedm ann, 1973). But if at the global level there is no 
consideration of the spatial distribution of investment these programmes 
might be implemented anywhere, with adverse consequences for particular 
regions and areas. It might also result in different outputs between the 
national economic policies and w hat is proposed by sectoral plans. An 
example might be firstly, the declaration of G uadalajara a deconcentration 
area when it could be one viable alternative to Mexico City. The 
infrastructure, labour and economic development it enjoys, could have made 
it a real development pole for its region. Secondly, this happens at the 
same time when Puebla and other cities around the capital are declared as 
posible places for deconcentration. Additionally, there is poor co­
ordination between the planning of different sectors. Leading to different 
sets of regionalizations of the country. Therefore to different set of 
priorities for cities and regions between for example, the industrial & 
commerce sector and its urban development counterpart.
The converse problem is the lack of economic basis to the 
spatial plans. This tends to make them a set of unrealistic "designs" of 
cities, which will not be considered seriously by local governments when 
taking investment decisions. Physical planning has failed to see the city
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as an integrated part of its region. Local plans do not seem to see beyond 
their boundaries the consequences of external causes of the problems. It 
may suggest some actions but probably not considering the implications they 
might have on the city's hinterland. Then, plans seem to consider land 
uses just as coloured parts of the maps, and not as a part of more deeply 
concerned socio-economic policies. Therefore, it may sometimes propose 
actions that are politically good, but economically unfeasible, like the 
num ber of houses needed to be built in the area by the simple relation 
population-No. of houses needed, without considering the implications that 
might affect that number, as availability of jobs (and its trends), or a 
nearer place with better services or infrastructure, or transport services 
between cities which may make easier commuting instead of living in the 
area, etc. Or the simple question of local resources to implement those 
programmes, which are normally reduced at the point they may need to be 
carried out by other federal agencies or "quangos". These quangos 
represent another problem because even when they are part of the "Urban 
Development Sector", their actions are not controlled or "supervised" by 
Sedue, they are independent in tha t respect. So, their actions might not 
be directed by a local plan, but their own "national priorities" (which 
again may be different from Sedue's).
Another problem is th a t even when the administrative 
structure of the government corresponds to this global-sectoral structure, 
and allows it to run smoothly through, the spatial structure of the regions 
do not necessarily correspond to it. This is the case of Puebla, whose 
conurbation includes at least two municipalities of the neighbouring State 
of Tlaxcala, apart from six on its own state. These spatial barriers
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"obstruct" the application of national policies throughout complete 
economic regions. This forces central government to create parallel 
structures for planning with different coverage, as the conurbation 
commissions or the river basin programmes. Adding yet another institution 
with little similarity to the governmental structure working at the local 
level, but controlled centrally. Displacing the local governments by 
taking control of local economic decisions.
5.3.2. Consequences at the level of State and City.
A t the local level, state's economic planners, as it was 
implied, are left to meet the targets set at the national level in the key 
or strategic parts of the economy, with the state's scarce economic 
resources and low economic self-sufficiency (chapter IV). This has left 
them to either look for the best use of the national policies adapting them 
to their local circumstances (this will be discussed in more detail in the 
case of industry, below) or lose investment in their territory. In the 
first case, the States with more infrastructure are the ones with more 
possibilities of being taken more seriously by the Federal Government and 
industrialists alike when deciding industrial investments, therefore it may 
imply competition between states to take advantage of federal policies, 
instead of co-operation between them to achieve a more uniform development 
throughout. This consequently results, in terms of industry for example, 
in more concentration in states or regions which already enjoy certain 
levels of industrialization ie. those closer to the central region. This, 
at the same time when urban planners are engaged in making detailed designs
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for urban areas which fail to be realistic and to point out to economic 
planners the problems further concentration would have in urban areas.
The results are detailed urban plans that seem to be far 
away from reality and can only describe w hat already happened in the cities 
and hope their predictions will be enforced, instead of planning their 
future. Or economic policies that have to adapt national policies to their 
own enviroment by concentrating programmes and projects in certain areas, 
without thinking in the consequences for the cities' structure.
5.4. The Political Factor.
The discrepancies between global, sectoral and local 
policies are not only the result of the divorce between regional and urban 
planning or between social, economic and physical factors in planning. 
They are also the result of the structure and functioning of the political 
system in the country. Mexico is characterized by the establishment of 
political control by one party (Looney, 1985:17), the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido revolucionario Institucional). It is a 
heavily centralised political system which does not allow self- 
determination at the State or municipal levels because there is a tradition 
and practice of executive predominance of federal over state and municipal 
government (Shafer, 1966). Therefore, the political system does not 
adequately take into account the needs of local government, nor allows for 
public participation in or open debate about the economic and political 
decisions which concern the Nation, perhaps because of its fears of losing
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control of the system itself. This has led it to create a model of policy 
making in which the actions are initiated at the top level and then 
disguised as local initiatives. The whole political apparatus turns about 
the figure of the President, who has absolute power and for six years 
decides the country's destiny, because there is an overcentralization of 
decision-making in the office of the president without adequate machinery 
of study (Shafer, 1966:9). He is elected for a period of six years and 
constitutionally cannot be re-elected. Therefore, Governors and 
Secretaries of State will conform "teams" in turn a leader, the President 
(W ard, 1986). They all belong to the ruling PRI. He is not the leader of 
the party although he posseses unquestioned authority throughout all 
echelons of the party structure (Shafer, 1966) to influence the party's 
im portant decisions. The party is a parallel structure, very simmilar to 
the Government's. All presidents, governors and top officials since 1930's 
have belonged to the PRI. So, it is very im portant to perform well in the 
party leaders' eyes to get promotion since "key Mexican decison makers at 
the national level with exemption of the president, are not 
elected" (Camp, 1985:98). Therefore although being in the party does not 
guarantee a job in the government, one cannot get a top level job if one 
does not belong to the party. A good measure then is to enter the party as 
well as to enter one of the "teams" or camarillas around the president. As 
the president, each im portant figure in the political scene will form a 
team with colleagues loyal to him (W ard, 1986); and together they will try 
to gain the trust of the President. Each team will help its leader to have 
a better post, since that will help each member to go up a number of steps 
in the institutional ladder depending on their performance. Rivalries 
between teams are common. Camp argues that:
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"...top-level personel decisions in Mexico are influenced by a combination 
of factors among them the confidence that a superior has in a particular 
subordinate, the political skills of the appointee, the group of camarilla 
connections shared by superior and subordinate, the freedom given to superiors by 
the president to choose their own subordinates, the particular expertise of the 
individual being considered and its relationship to the position, and the values 
shared by both parties" (Camp, 1985:105).
This indicates some of the problems of centralization, 
because power tends to be exercised by an small elite of people, which 
attem pts to secure, first and foremost, the interests of its own group. 
Pressure from other dom inant groups (ie. the business and commerce or 
industrial groups), or strong social demands, may lead it give away some of 
these benefits. (Looney, 1985; Shafer, 1966)
A consequence of this is the way the candidates to governors 
are designated by the president himself maybe as a reward to their 
performance in his team, instead of being designated locally not to say by 
the public, but at least by all members and sectors of the party. The 
candidate is usually an im portant figure in the cabinet or in the Federal 
District's government. Resulting in an elected governor whose committment 
to the Federal Government (and the President himself) will be stronger than 
to local issues, or indeed in critisising the federal government's policies 
( 1).
This also will create a period of time of at least one year, 
in which the new governor, being the chief executive of the state, will
(1) Every candidate for governor of the ruling party has won the elections for 
the past 50 years. Only recently that pattern began to show problems as it was seen in 
the recent elections in Chihuahua, were the candidate for the opposition was more popular 
than the official one and some problems and disputes over cheating in the counting arose. 
This has begun to change the pattern in certain states towards designating a local 
candidate, altough with some central links.
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have to "learn" the problems of the state and the programmes currently in 
operation as well as those programmed or under revision. The same will 
happen to the colleagues who followed him.
In effect, the political structure of the government is very 
much similar of that of the planning system. The posts are divided between 
the most prominent figures according to their performance in the 
government. Thus creating state government's officials or institution's 
chairmen with more links to the political system of the central government 
than to local issues and therefore low comittment to real decentralization 
policies, as they may expect after their term finishes to return to have 
another post within the central government.
All this is very im portant since is going to influence the 
planning process. Different teams in different secretariats will not share 
"vital" information which could give other teams an opportunity (W ard, 
1986). Therefore planners in SPP will not share information with Sedue's, 
or between any other secretariat until the process is finished. Thus a 
corporate view of the problems seems unlikely, at least at top levels, 
since loyalty and share of information is exercised in a top-down approach 
and not horizontally. Some levels down, however, things may change a 
little, as mobility between teams decreases and "loyalty" to the job 
increases. Information can be shared more easily as there are people who 
probably moved to another planning departm ent in another secretariat and 
knows the people and mechanisms to have the right information needed. 
Nevertheless, the working of this complicated structure makes any action 
which is not compatible with the whole system unlikely to be implemented.
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The government have changed the political discourse towards a more 
democratic participation of the public and other tiers of government in the 
decision-making process but, not the actions. They are still relying on a 
heavy centralized system for the "efficient" working of the country.
5.5. The Resulting Lack of Attention to Local Needs.
The last discussion may help to explain some of the aspects 
surrounding planning's implementation at the State or municipal levels, 
which influences its output.
As it was said in chapter three, the national policies for 
industrial development since 1940 were implemented towards the 
industrialization of the country through the stablishment of industry 
mainly in Mexico City. Those economic policies were aimed at the 
development and diversification of the industrial infrastructure and had no 
spatial limitations of any kind which might have encouraged balanced 
development of the nation. Thus apart from the capital city the other 
cities which already enjoyed a sufficient infrastructure grew further, ie. 
M onterrey and G uadalajara, the second and third largest cities in the 
country. For example, Derossi (cited by Scott, 1982:119) showed that 
M onterrey had already been established as an industrial centre by 1940, and 
that its later growth was largely based on the continued exploitation of 
its initial advantage relative to other cities and regions. Furthermore, 
the rank of the seven more im portant cities in the country has not changed 
in its first four places since 1900 (tables 5-1 and 5-2).
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Table 5-1
Rank of -the seven mo si important cities in Mexico 1900-1930.
Rank 1900_________________1910___________1921___________1930
1 MAMC MAMC MAMC MAMC
2 Guadalajara Guadalajara Guadalajara Guadalajara
3 Puebla Puebla Puebla Monterrey
4 Leon Monterrey Monterrey Puebla
5 Monterrey S.L.P. Merida Merida
6 S.L.P. Merida S.L.P. Tampico
 7______ Merida______________ Leon___________Veracruz______ S.L.P______
Note: S.L.P.= San Luis Potosi.
Source: Unikel, 1976
As a result of these policies, between 1940 and 1981 the 
Mexican economy grew at 6.6% per annum "a record unique in the developing 
world" (Gardner, 1987). In manufacturing the growth was at over 8% per 
annum. This period of economic growth helped to increase both the total * 
population and its character, Mexico became an urban country.
However, the social costs of economic growth were begining 
to surface and social unrest arising in 1968 and 1971 began to signal to 
the federal government that changes in the policies had to be made.
Table 5-2
Rank of the seven most important cities in Mexico 1940-1970.
Rank 1940 1950 1960 1970
1 MAMC MAMC MAMC MAMC
2 Guadalajara Guadalajara Guadalajara Guadalajara
3 Monterrey Monterrey Monterrey Monterrey
4 Puebla Puebla Puebla Puebla
5 Tampico Torreon Torreon Cd. Juarez
6 Torreon Merida Cd. Juarez Leon
7 Merida Tampico Leon Tijuana
Note: S.L.P.= San Luis Potosi. 
Source: Unikel, 1976
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5.5.1. The need for Social Development.
As indicated in chapter three, the government of President 
Echeverria changed in early 1970's the policies towards a more balanced 
development of the nation. For the first time, the concept of alternative 
cities to Mexico City as development poles was introduced. Economic growth 
as the only goal for development was abandoned and also stressed economic 
justice, increase employment, better income distribution, improved 
standards of living, and reduced external dependance (Bueno and Yunnez N. 
cited by Story, 1986:151). The industrial policies were then intended to 
deconcentrate the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (M AM C), to achieve a 
more balanced economic growth.
But the legacy of years of government policies -with and 
without spatial objectives- which created concentration, could not be 
changed simply by worthwhile sentiments, if real commitment did not exist 
or if the bussines sector's interests were in jeopardy(2), and force the 
government to give national economic growth priority over social and 
regional development.
As an example, there was a law of New and Necessary 
Industries passed in 1941 which exempted certain industries from taxes, but 
without considering their location. From 737 industries which recieved
(2) Story reported that President Echeverria's policies made the private 
sector to present a unified front against the "exceses" (commas are mine) of the 
government, this is important since Mexican industrialists have had considerable succes in 
affecting policy decisions through two principal strategies: blocking policy alternatives 
or changes, or influencing the implementation of policy initiatives. (Story, 1986).
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fiscal incentives under this law between 1940-64, more than 70% are in the 
Central Region, and from these, most of them are in the M AM C area (Unikel, 
1976:311). This law was not abolished until 1975, more than five years 
after the government commited itself to decentralization. This was 
possible only after strong criticisms from groups in and outside the 
government. Aspects of the intitutional structure which are producing the 
problems should have to be changed before changing the policies. If this 
is not done, the results might be too small to be accounted for.
To change this view is also difficult to be taken 
independently, being an active part of the capitalist world, where some 
policies are implemented because of pressure from international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International M onetary Fund 
(IM F), which force the government to introduce some economic meassures or 
cut off investment. The change can be done if as needed at the local 
level, the institutions are showed the economic and social benefits of 
investing in long-run social development instead of fast economic growth.
"The nation has borne the heavy responsibility for trade promotion, job 
creation and foreign policy. But those responsibilities have not 
necessarely enhanced the state power" (Sanderson, 1986). The government 
has been forced to act and take actions on a very restricted menu of 
political choices. This can as Sanderson argues, make the power of the 
state to actually decline, since it founds that its opportunities to exit 
from economic crisis are shaped more narrowly in the form of a recipe for 
deeper integration into the international economic system. This can affect 
its independence and more dangerously, its ability to find an indigenous 
path for economic self-sufficiency to face economic crisis without having
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to rely (at least heavely) on international institutions. This self- 
sufficiency would give the government, the ability to find an "insurance 
policy" to sustained growth.
Then, it is difficult to produce real changes, without 
changing not only the policies but the instruments necessary to enforce 
them as well as the attitudes towards the problems.
In 1972, legislation was introduced by the government to 
establish fiscal incentives to promote decentralization and regional 
development. This was a more precise elaboration of a 1971 decree, which 
proposed to compensate the discrepancies between regions linking them to 
the objectives of national economic efficiency and social justice, 
generation of exports and employment.
To achieve these goals, three zones were defined: Zone I 
included the Federal District and 8 municipalities of the State of Mexico; 
Monterrey with 5 of its surrounding municipalities; and G uadalajara. Zone 
II included 2 municipalities of G uadalajara (Tlaquepaque and Zapopan); the 
cities of Puebla, Queretaro, Toluca and Cuernavaca (all capitals of States 
in the Central Region); and Zone III, the rest of the country (map 5-1).
Fiscal exemptions were distributed according to this 
distribution. No incentives were devised for industry in Zone I. However, 
few distinctions were drawn between zones II and III. Industries locating 
in Zone III could have exemptions for more time (5 to 10 years) than those 
locating in Zone II (3 to 7 years), while the am ount of exemptions was
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almost the same ( 60% to 100% for Zone III and 50% to 100% to Zone II). 
Both areas were elegilble for these exemptions on import duties, sales, 
stam p and capital gains taxes. (Table 5-3).
As it can be seen, by declaring no incentives to the M AMC, 
and other two major metropolitan areas, bu t doing it to their surroundings, 
the clear outcome was going to be more industrial settlements around them.
As the differences between the rest of the Zones were so small, the more 
likely outcome was to encourage industry to settle in areas too close to 
these areas (principaly the M A M C s) and still getting incentives. Thus 
further increasing concentration.
Also, the nomination of M onterrey and G uadalajara as Zone I 
areas, was more likely to be a political move to avoid undesiderable 
competition from these two cities, since they could become the real 
development pole alternatives the country was needing, because of their 
already great industrial activity which make them after Mexico City, the 
largest industrial centres in the country. Also, Monterrey for example, is 
where one of the most influential private sector groups has its 
headquarters: Monterrey Group (Looney, 1978). Then it probably would mean
Table 5-3
Distribution of Incentives for Decentralization throughout the different Zones
New Enterprise Extension of industry
Exemptions Zone I Zone II Zone I Zone II
Import Duties
V.
50-100 60-100
’/ .
50-100 60-100
Stamp Taxes 50-100 60-100 50-100 60-100
Sales 60-100 60-100
Capital Gains 50-100 60-100
Source: Decreto que senala los estimulos fiscales y
facilidades que se otorgaran a empresas industriales. 
Diario Oficial de la Federacion. 20 de julio de 1982.
The need for Social Development 103
to give to it power in the economic decision-making of the country, since 
this group is already somewhat independent from the government decisions. 
It would mean also to give more power to a group which for example, has 
given substantial support to the strongest opposition party, the right-wing 
National Action party (PAN) (Story, 1986:91). If these two cities were 
ecouraged to have a bigger share in the economic decisions of the country, 
it would had to be at the expense of the M A M C s share. This is what they 
might be fearing. These cities were in terms of infrastructure and 
resources, the more likely alternative centres for really encouraging 
development outside the Federal District.
Furthermore, serious doubts appear about the rationale 
behind the government's attitude and the real possibilities of such a 
decree when at the time it was passed, the 1941 law was still in force. A 
given industry settling in Zone III could still apply for its benefits 
bypassing the decentralization criteria if it was considered "new" or 
"neccessary". More importanly, in the Zone III "The rest of the country" 
nothing was proposed to attract industries or to create new development 
poles, so again, the industries would not be attracted to go farther away 
when they could be much nearer to the metropolitan areas and still get the 
same incentives.
In respect to the local legislation in the states, they 
could implement their own economic policies. If the Zone II cities 
corresponded to the satellite cities of the M AMC, and the zones included 
only the area covered by the city itself at the time of the policies, the 
options open to the local authorities to go round the national policies
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were: One, to attract industry by for example, creating industrial areas 
around the city (therefore being in Zone III), and offer them better 
incentives. In this way the industries would still be not too far from the 
capital city and have Zone III incentives. O r Two, if the city would not 
bother in creating new industrial areas around it, it simply could give 
them the incentives it thought were necessary in order to develop the 
state.
That is precisely what happened in Puebla. In 1972, the 
same year the federal decree was passed, a law of Industrial Development 
and Promotion of Industrial Parks, Corridors and Cities created 10 year tax 
deductions for those "new and neccessary" industries not benefited by the 
federal law, irrespective of location.
However, the same law exorts the urban and suburban 
industries catalogued as poluting ones to move out of the city, to the 
existing industrial parks (Mele, 1986). Giving to industries moving, a 5 
year tax exemption. This is a double sided measure, since the existing 
parks at the time were just outside the city limits (in Zone II) thus the 
pollution problems would not be overcomed, while the industries would have 
further exemptions.
Then, both the Federal and local governments have been 
talking about the benefits of decentralization, but their actions give the 
impression that they are not sincere in their proposals. The opposition 
between Federal decree and State law, can do little to change the existing 
patterns of industrial location. In fact they might be emphasizing them.
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As said above, with little real commitment by federal authorities to 
changes, together with local opportunism, even when both governments are 
talking about the same aim, the results might be the opposite.
Moreover, these social reforms were considered far reaching 
by the business sector, who oppossed them, resulting in a strong economic 
crisis at the end of the administration in 1976. Capital flight and 
resistance from right wing groups made the government dilute or drop these 
altogether. (W ard, 1986; Story, 1986).
5.5.2. National Goals with Local Priorities.
The next administration of President Lopez Portillo made 
some more specific aims when retook the deconcentration policies, this time 
more concrete aims were drawn. Although as indicated in chapter two, the 
problems of having different plans aimed at the same thing can cause 
troubles, this time more accurate and more long-term proposals were set. 
Economic and spatial planning seemed to be complementing each other. It 
was also the time when under the influential Arq. Pedro Ramirez Vazquez, 
the then Secretary of Human Settlements and Public Works (SAHOP), had 
very strong profile in the government's actions. Arq. Ramirez Vazquez was 
really commited himself to his job. He made the changes necessary at the 
time to really begin to make planning an integrated socio-economic process.
A decree in 1979, according to the National Urban 
Development Plan of 1978, set the new industrial areas of the
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administration for industrial developm ent^). While the National 
Industrial Development Plan intends to reduce industrial production in the 
Valley of Mexico from 50% (the 1979 level) to 40 % of the national gross 
production value. It means that almost 70% of the growth forecasted beteen 
1979 and 1982 should had to be done elswhere out of this zone. (Natl. 
Devt. Plan cited by Mele, 1986).
The decree establishes as its main aims to: make a rational 
distribution of economic activities throughout the territory according to 
potentiality of certain areas, according to the National U rban Development 
Plan. To achieve this, the decree divides the country into three zones:
Zone I of "Preferential Stimulus", divided into Zone la Industrial Ports 
Development, and Zone lb of municipalities with potentiality to have 
industrial development, these are mainly in the border zones and around 
some industrial cities. Zone II of "State Priority"(map 5-2); the 
municipalities which according to State's Urban Development Plan and within 
the context of the National plan would be considered by state governments 
as potentially good as industrial locations. Zone III of "Ordening and 
Regulation" (map 5-3); Divided into Zone Ilia  of controlled growth, 
conformed by D.F. and 50 municipalities of the State of Mexico around it. 
And Zone Illb , "Consolidation", which was to receive limited incentives to 
avoid the negative consequences of more concentration, conformed by some 
municipalities of the states of Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla and Tlaxcala in 
the Central Region. Hence Zone Illb  included the outskirts of the 
industrial area in Mexico City's metropolitan area (MAM C) (map 5-3).
(3) Decreto por el que se establecen zonas geograficas para la ejecucion 
del Pro grama de Estimulos para la Desconcentracion Territorial de las Actividades 
Industrials Publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federacion del 2 de febrero de 1979.
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The incentives, which did nothing to change the locational 
criteria of industrialists in the past, bu t drawn some resources from the 
states as tax reliefs (Scott, 1982), this time were given in the way of 
proportional credits according to investment and job creation towards 
payment of Federal Taxes. The credit would be issued to a firm as a 
certificate of Fiscal Promotion (CEPRO FI, Certificado de Promocion Fiscal), 
which would be valid for five years, could be applied against any federal 
tax not already dedicated by law to a specific purpouse, and would replace 
any current tax exemptions. The tax credit could be given for both 
increased investment and additional employment generated. The size of the 
investment tax credit would be determinated by sectoral and regional 
priorities. The employment credit tax was a uniform 20 percent of the 
annual payroll cost of the additional employment (calculated according to 
the annual minimum wage in that zone).
The maximum incentives were designed to cover Zone I, and 
according to the importance and type of the industry, they varied from 
nothing in Zone III to 20% in Zone I. Although small industry could 
receive up to 25% regardless of its location (except in Zone III). 
Industry was divided into two categories, Category I Agroindustry and 
industrial machinery; and Category II Consumer durables, receiving Cat. I 
a 20% stimulus while Cat. II depending on its location from 10% to 20%.(4)
As it can be seen, some fundam ental changes began to appear
(4) Decreto que establece los estimulos fiscales para el fomento del empleo 
y la inversion en las actividades industriales. Publicado en el Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion del 6 de marzo de 1979.
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between the 1972 and 1979 decrees, while the former only made differences 
of regions according to their distance to the metropolitan areas without 
considering any spatial distribution of activities troughout the territory.
The 1979 decree began to consider a distribution of activities according to 
different endowements of different regions according to a National U rban 
Development Plan. Thus emphasizing the need for a spatial distribution of 
economic activities in certain regions of the country. Also the stimulus 
where drawn according to type of industry and location not as in the 
previous one, uniformedly regardless of type of industry. Another 
im portant difference was the consideration of priorities of the 
municipalities according to local needs. It was the first time it was 
stated the states could influence the areas for federal investment 
according to their own needs. This was surely m eant to avoid the kind of 
discrepancies between federal and state policy that happened during the 
first decree's life.
This made possible for example, the State of Tlaxacala to 
declare as priority municipalities those in the axis formed by the road to 
Veracruz, from west to east, to impulse Apizaco's development (it is its 
principal city after Tlaxacala city); and at the same time to try to depend 
less on Puebla's influence (map 5-2).
Meanwhile Puebla, a much bigger state, had wider choices.
It declared a more spreaded number of municipalities troughout the state, 
concentrated in the areas with more possibilities at the north, centre and 
east of the state. They were municipalities around cities which enjoyed 
certain levels of development that made real the possibility of investment
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being assimilated more easily than if concentrated around the city of 
Puebla.
However, according to the guidelines, Sahop devised its 
"system of cities" to allow the state governments to devise their own 
municipal priorities. In the system, each major city was given one of 
three categories: One Huge city of Mexico, which included its State of 
Mexico conurbation. Two big cities, M onterrey and G uadalajara; and 52 
medium size cities, apart from the rest of localities up to rural centres.
Being these 52 cities the ones in which the co-ordinated efforts of the 
secretariats would be focused. The system was set entirely by Sahop, and 
no input was made by the states themselves. Such a huge division could not 
see the parcularities involving each state, therefore problems arose. In 
Tlaxcala, they were constrained because its capital and not Apizaco, was 
declared as a medium city, making to them more difficult to apply for 
federal resources to that city since Apizaco was not considered as an 
im portant city in the state's context, or at least not as im portant as 
Tlaxacala's capital. This forced its planning departm ents to ask for more 
resources and to plan investments to its capital city, even when their own 
State's Urban Development Plan did not consider Tlaxcala the best place to 
invest. This, because of it being too close to Puebla city, would make it 
to depend more on Puebla than to have its own system within the state.
The State of Tlaxcala U rban Development Plan, also 
considered Apizaco the city to be impulsed and not Tlaxcala, but the 
national system of cities was not changed. The causes were more because of 
political misunderstanding than planning reasons. Every single state in
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the country was to have a medium city. Principaly they were thinking that 
this would avoid confrontation between states. Their capitals were then 
assigned as medium cities. Moreover, that makes one to have some doubts 
about the whole system of cities' real possibilities of implementation, 
since it did not take into account the real economic regions of the cities 
envolved.
The proposal was good, but two main problems arose. 
Firstly, the system was unable to give up its centralized character. Much 
could have been done if in the First place, the states were submitted 
projects for their proposed internal system of cites according to their 
needs (and not the opposite) to feed the National System after the goals 
were set. In that way making it more comprehensive. If for example, 
Tlaxcala would had been asked, and Apizaco set as its medium size city, it 
could have Firstly, avoided the state future problems of investment in that 
city. Secondly, it could have encouraged investment in the north of the 
state, where is more needed by the state to depend less on Puebla city.
Secondly, the industrialists opposed to decentralization 
policies because they feared regional industries would be benefited at the 
expense urban industries (Story, 1986). These resistence efforts provided 
to be powerful since for example, the data on tax credits (SEPROFIs) show 
that the controlled growth region of Zone Ilia  (principally Mexico City) 
received considerable tax credits in spite of its very limited incentives.
However, international economic factors appeared in 1982 
which halted almost any effort. Oil prices collapsed, which together with
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internal economic crisis and corruption problems, drived Mexico into its 
worst ever economic crisis. The Mexican peso was devaluated more than 100% 
overnight. Inflation began to reach record levels. Capital flight almost 
emptied Treasury's coffers. International institutions began then to press 
the government to implement austerity measures aimed at economic recovery. 
Again, economic development was given priority over social development. 
This halted some projects for agricultural development, like the SAM, the 
Mexican Alimentary System and its employment, nutrition and other benefits 
(Sanderson, 1986).
5.5.3. Economic Recovery.
When President Miguel de la M adrid entered office in 1982, 
economic planning was aimed at "structural changes" through the impulse of 
export-related industry. Economic growth was aimed by "would-be 
revolution" reforms (Gardner, 1987) like among others: Cuts in the budget 
deficit equivalent of 10% G D P in real terms, fiscal reform linking taxes to 
inflation, privatisation of state owned enterprises, promoting non oil 
exports through the wholesale lifting of protection and by depressing 
domestic demand, and by offering easier access to foreign investors. The 
president himself being the former SPP's secretary, had little commitment 
to spatial planning (W ard, 1986)
This made difficult to think in investments in the country 
aimed to achieve a more balanced social development. The first step was to 
remove Arq. Ramirez Vazquez and change the secretary's name to its actual
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Secretariat of U rban Development and Ecology (SEDUE)(5) (see chapter 
three.) The discourse was changed towards a "no disperse deconcentration" 
one.
This time, a National Development Plan was first devised to 
"economic recovery" and "structural change" (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 
1983). The plan retakes the previous regionalization, although it declares 
that im portant high-tech industries would be orientated to those zones with 
infrastructure in research and development.(Mele, 1986). This mean main 
cities will have the more specialized industry while the rest of the 
country is left to receive heavy industry. This is obviously going to 
emphasize actual patterns instead of diversified them. Because it would 
probably mean headquarters being established in the capital while the 
industry is elswhere. Thus the decisions still would be taken in the 
centre.
Growth will be restricted to those areas which already 
enjoy some industrial infrastructure. Indeed, this non-disperse 
deconcentration is going to be aimed to those medium cities and industrial 
corridors selected as "motor centres" (National Programme of Industrial 
Promotion and Foreign Trade, cited by Mele, 1986). But being the cities
(5) The new secretary was a lawyer who knew little about the Secretariat's 
work, not even the "business language" which made him to make some mistakes when 
explaining some actions to the media. He was removed after almost three years in office. 
This time, an architect was promoted, but had the misfortune of being in office during the 
1985 heartquake and was severely critisized by the media for his handling and slow 
response to the problem. He was removed after a few months in office. Now an economist 
member of the SPP's team was appointed. Therefore most probably from a different "team" 
of that of the rest of heads in the secretariat, which resulted in ressignation of some 
valuable personnel. All these changes avoid continuity and a coherent handling of the 
ministry's tasks.
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with more infrastructure mainly those ones around Mexico City, like Puebla, 
the ones with well serviced industrial parks, the outcome cannot be other 
than increased concentration. Even if there are more cities aimed at 
industrial decentralization, not having infrastructure would make more 
difficult to them to attract industry. Unless they implement drastic 
measures like larger tax exemptions and almost free sites. But even in 
that case they would face strong competition from those well equiped 
cities. Again, with the exemption of those states whose territories are 
covered by Zone III restrictions (Hidalgo, Mexico, Tlaxcala and Morelos), 
all states have at least one of these motor centres. These centres are 
less numerous that in the previous case. This could guarantee more 
investment going to less number of cities, which is good. However, being 
those cities nearer the centre the most likely to receive that investment, 
it probably would mean in real terms, more investment to the infrastructure 
of the centre than to the rest of the country, since more cities would be 
located there. A part from the attraction of specific type of firms to the 
metropolitan areas, the only new change in a 1985 decree is to promote 
relocation of heavelly polluting industry out of Zone Ilia .
However, as Mele argues, these incentives already existed 
and the only one new difference is the promotion of industrial corridors 
and parks in Zone Illb  (Central Region) to all kinds of industry.
This time the changes are more form than substance. From 
now on, there will be programmes instead of plans. The only one plan which 
remains with such a title is the National Development Plan. The rest 
remained mainly unchanged, with the excemption of Sedue's activities, which
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were reduced even more when its public works section was removed. 
Therefore, it was left with the responsibility of making programmes (former 
plans) for those medium cities' development, but the responsibility of 
funding those programmes was given to SPP. Thus clearly emphasising the 
role urban planning has been assigned by the authorities, ie. to restrict 
itself to the limits of cities, without considering broader aspects of 
development. Thus relegating the importance of spatial aspects of the 
policies for the development of the country at the national level.
W hat view local authorities like those in Puebla and 
Tlaxcala in the Central Region, can have of the secretariat. It is 
promoting the development of the country, but only making city plans, which 
is a task the local authorities themselves must perform. Furtherm ore, it 
leaves them after those plans are completly formulated, with no assurance 
that they are going to be funded, therefore implemented. Local planners 
are left with the impression that urban planning at federal level is yet 
another excuse to influence and act directly at the local level. They have 
seen three different federal adm inistration's policies, but none of them 
had approached them to ask what results the previous policies achieved in 
their territories, which together with their own government's lack of 
resolution to changes, have left them to be reticent to take any new 
central policy. Leaving them, as it is going to be showed in Part II, to 
try  to take as much advantage as possible of federal investment in their 
territories by for example, attracting industry without considering the 
implications it might have to their own social development.
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5.6. Conclusion. Part I
It is clear that announcing changes in policy and the 
rhetoric, does not guarantee that they will be effective or that they will 
generate economic growth with social equity. If little attention is put on 
changes of substance identifying the factors that are making the country to 
have such social discrepancies. W ithout considering the roles different 
sectors of society as well as economic and spatial plannings can have on 
the development of the nation, it would be difficult to achieve positive 
results.
Real decentralization is im portant since it is going to 
affect the development of the country. It has been shown that planning 
from "above" involves programmes of unequal growth and urban bias towards 
the centre of decision-making. Decentralization then, will have move the 
concept of economic growth towards a broader socially-oriented one. It 
carries the importance of the government looking for a longer term of 
social development against shorter impressive economic growth. It implies 
then, a broader and equitable distribution of economic activities as well 
as a broader social participation in the process and a more democratic view 
of national development.
Planning should cover all scales of decision-making or it 
will not be effective. Economic targets should be coherent with spatial 
regions at national as well as regional and city levels, to achieve 
positive results. Spatial planning has been left at the local level of 
land uses, to give way to a "more im portant" national economic planning.
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Thus restricting its power and the prospects of a coherent social 
development in the long-run.
As a consequence, urban planners have put aside the social 
implications of their plans (just when they were beginning to consider the 
possibility of including them) in an effort to attract investment to their 
regions. Spatial planning is carried out in its narrowest perspective. 
Planning is seen as an activity which can do little to change the existing 
patterns of social inequalities (planners have seen three administrations 
achieving very little), and are beginning to consider plans as a mere 
requisite to fulfill, when asking for resources.
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PART II
THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY AS A DEVELOPMENT FACTOR
5.7. The use of industry to consolidate central control.
Industry has always been regarded by the government as 
crutial to the development of the country in terms of its contribution to 
jobs, income and exports. It has always been an im portant consideration in 
national policy and has tended to be given greater importance than social 
development.
The political and economic system in Mexico, was established 
following a process of centralization of decision-making in which industry 
has played an im portant role. The capital city have had the sufficient 
economic and political influence to ensure its dominance in terms of the 
availability of communications, infrastructure (roads, rail, etc.) and 
diffusion of innovation, which produced massive concentrations of 
population which represented to industry good availability of labour, plus 
the best accesibility to national markets. This helped to increase the 
divisions between the capital and the rest of the country:
"...(because of) the way the territory had been organised... the 
infrastructure, the transport and communication services generally 
converged on the central subsystem... Thus the remaining centres of any 
importance were practically without any linkages with each other, since in 
almost all cases their links were with and through the main centre."
(Mattos, 1982 )
In the central region for example, to go from Puebla to
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Pachuca (the capital of Hidalgo) it would be faster to go first to Mexico 
City and then to Pachuca. There are few links between main cities, 
certainly not as fast or as good as between Mexico City and the capitals of 
the central region states.
Thus as Castells (1978) argues, concentration of population 
and decision-making has also led to concentration of industry. In Mexico, 
the Federal District, and the two mayor urban centres, G uadalajara, and 
M onterrey have received most of the benefits of industrialization (Story, 
1986) then: "economic and territorial concentration have tended to 
strengthen each other mutually." (de M attos, 1982).
Furthermore federal government's intervention in the 
industrial sector had generally been used to strenghten these patterns, 
creating an enviroment "very favourable to profitable private enterprise 
particularly foreign investment" (Looney, 1978), which favoured further 
geographical concentration of economic activity. The very fact that almost 
all the infrastructure, labour, communications etc. were concentrated in 
the Federal District, made it very difficult for any city which was 
relatively remote to the capital city to become a new development pole at 
least, in the short term. The am ount of investment and time needed to 
create the infrastructure, labour supply, transport systems, housing etc. 
needed to attract industry is so great that considerable political 
commitment is required if worthwhile results are expected.
T hat is why cities in the states nearer to the centre have 
been the target of investment from industrialists and government after the
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M AM C became "problematic". Cities such as Puebla and the other states' 
capitals in the Central Region of Mexico have been receiving regional 
infrastructure, investment and industries
In that way, industries and the economic benefits/growth 
they imply would not be far away from the political centre, to be 
controlled, and their benefits enjoyed, by the ruling elite. That might be 
the rationale behind federal investment in the infrastructure of the 
centre. T hat may be also why, the policies of decentralization have not 
reached other regions.
5.8. The emergence of the megalopolis.
These policies have made cities near Mexico City to seem to 
have received the benefits of industrialization, but in reality they have 
only deepened its dependency on Mexico City.
Even when Puebla has been traditionally regarded as an 
industrial centre, during the past 15 years or so, it has experienced 
changes in the number and type of industries it houses. Some of the 
industries it is receiving are beginning to be concentrated in a small part 
of the territory of the state. After 1940 when the policies for industrial 
development changed towards the rapid industrialization of the country, 
Puebla lost its place in the national context. Nevertheless it is still 
the fourth most im portant city in Mexico.
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In 1930 the State of Puebla was ranked second only to Mexico 
City in employment availability in the Central Region. In 1975 it was 
third with 7% of total employment. Its rate of industrial employment 
growth has also diminished when it is compared with the other states in the 
region. In the decade of 1960-1970 this rate of industrial employment 
grows 40% in Puebla, while in the D.F. grows 60%, in the state of Mexico 
150%, 200% in Tlaxcala and Queretaro and 185% in M orelos(l). In 1970-1975, 
only the D.F. has a slower growth (11.2 for D.F. and 14.3 for Puebla, 
respectively).
The relative decline is a reflection of firstly, the easiest 
accesibility from the D.F. to the other states on the region. For example, 
most of the state of Mexico's industrial growth is closely related to the 
fact that some of its municipalities conform a physical continuity with the 
D.F. and therefore, most of the industries settled there when the state 
took advantage of the early "decentralization" policies introduced in 
Mexico City, (see Chapters Three and Four).
Secondly, of the time, type and characteristics of the 
industries moving to Puebla. While industries moving to the State of 
Mexico began to move in the late forties and early fifties, those moving to 
Puebla began to do it in the sixties. The industries moving to the State 
of Mexico also were more numerous because they tended to be small and to 
depend more on the centre for their products' marketing (consumer durables, 
services, etc.). While those moving to Puebla where fewer in num ber but
(1) Data from an unpublished PhD by Alan Vannep. Evlolution des espaces 
industriels du la region du Mexique, cited by Patrice Mele, (1986) p3 Universidad Autonoma 
de Puebla.
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much bigger and more productive, as well as less dependant on the main city 
to m arket their products. Their m arket tended to be mostly nation-wide or 
even international, eg. car manufacturing steel and oil related industries.
In productivity terms, between 1960 and 1970 (the period in which most of 
them were established) the production volume growth in Puebla had record 
levels. More recently, those trends have continued, between 1979 and 1981, 
the growth of investment and the value of production has been higher than 
the increase on the levels of employment. Therefore it can be said that in 
Puebla industrial growth has not been at par with employment levels. It 
has meant high increase in revenue for industries with less growth in 
employment.
Indeed, despite the fact that those industries employ a high 
number of workers, the population of the State of Puebla remained mainly 
dedicated to agriculture. It was the state with the highest number of 
population employed in agriculture in the Central Region, with 7.4% of the 
total population of the country employed in agriculture (which is 56% of 
the State's Economic Active Population [EAP] employed in agriculture). 
While in manufacturing it was third in Central Region with 4.2% of the 
total population employed in m anufacturing in the country, as opposed to 
the 30.7% of the D.F. and 11.4% of the State of Mexico respectively (Scott, 
1982: table 5-6 p220-222).
Industrial growth in Puebla, has been closely related to 
actions of the central government (Chapter IV). The Federal Government is 
a major stimulus to industrial development, being im portant in terms of 
public investment in communications, transport etc. together with
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incentives to the private sector. These are much greater than the states' 
power which are reduced mainly to the form of tax incentives and reliefs, 
or the sale of the sites at very attractive prices -these most of the times 
being expropiated from "ejidos"(2)-. This implies that it was the federal 
government who in the first place, impulsed indirectly its industrial 
growth, and not local policies, since the conditions for industry to come 
were really laid-down by central government. The role of the private 
sector then, has been to take advantage of this public investment and 
sometimes to make pressure in the government to make more concesions in the 
name of the "national interest", as it was stated lately with the speech of 
the chairman of the National Chambers of Commerce when saying that "it was 
the time the governemt should take their responsibility on the crisis by 
taking the costs of reducing inflation to make the country to reach top 
again, by creating the necessary (economic) infrastructure". (Excelsior, 
November 9th, 1987). Implicity assuming then, that their role is only to 
use that investment without them taking much risks. Another example of 
their attitud was when they blocked the implementation of decentralization 
policies in the State of Mexico in 1970s because they were threatening 
their interests (Story, 1986).
In Puebla, the impact of the availability of infrastructure 
such as the railroad, gas pipe, high tension electricity line and mainly 
the motorway between Mexico City and Puebla has been the catalyst for an 
increase in industrial activity around Puebla city, along the motorway and
(2) It is a form of communal land used principally for agriculture, which 
is given by the Federal Government to peasants through the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform. 
It cannot be sold or usufructed by any other people than the peasants. They are called 
"ejidatarios".
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the main roads connecting the city with its surroundings. Fifteen out of 
the twenty-four main enterprises are located along the motorway, seven in 
Puebla's municipality and one in the municipality at the east of the city.
Just after the opening of the motorway in 1962, PEM EX ( 3 } 
opened a M ethanol plant, employing 360 workers, in 1965 Volkswagen opened 
its plant, employing 14,500 people today, which makes it the fourth largest 
employer in the industry in Latin America (the other three are in 
Brasil)( * } , and in 1967 Hylsa( B } opened a metallurgic plant employing 1,600 
people today .
These industries have induced the settlement of smaller 
industries to service them in and around Puebla, changing the type of 
industries settling there. In 1960, Puebla was ranked first nationaly in 
the number of its textile industries. It had one third of the whole 
"telares" (textile mills) in the country, now tha t number is decreasing and 
some im portant employers have had to close down because they were not using 
modern systems which could allow them to compete with others. The new type 
of industry uses principally, cheap urban labour and a few administrative 
workers.
The textile industry however, is more related to small 
workshops and with the traditional skills of the local population. In 
1984, 62% of the total of textile firms were employing less than 50
(3) PEMEX is the name of the parastatal oil corporation Petroleos
Mexicanos.
(4) South, january 1985 p63-82.
(5) Hojalata y Lamina, a private company which is part of the Alfa Group in 
Monterrey and produces steel products.
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employees; less than 20% of the textile industries in Puebla employ more 
than 100 employees (but employ 61% of the total workers in the industry). 
These characteristics make those industries to be "assimilated" more easily 
by the urban grid, without interfering with its normal functions. They can 
even be "distributed" more easily throughout the State's territory because 
they do not need large and costly infrastructure investments (water, 
electricity, gas etc.) as the big industries do. It also could be used for 
example, to encourage or sustain ancilliary activities like sheep farming.
All these will enable its benefits to be more easily assimilated by the 
region. It could also reduce the number of rural migrants being 
assimilated into the informal sector. Therefore demminishing the 
probabilities of disrupting even more the structure of the city, (see 
chapter three. "The problems of Concentration")
With the arrival of the new industries however, these 
patterns have began to change. Concentration appeared in Puebla and a few 
of the municipalities around it. In 1970, industrial concentration around 
the city of Puebla had grown at a point where only three municipalities in 
the state (Puebla, Cuautlancingo and Xoxtla) together had 77.6% of the 
value of the industrial production of the state, which is bigger if it is 
considered together with the other three municipalities' production in the 
area of growth towards the M AMC. Together they make 85.5% of the value of 
the production and 76.1% of the employment.
The closeness of the city of Puebla to the limits with the 
State of Tlaxcala has also m eant that some industries have settled there 
and have influenced the municipalities of the latter which are next to
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Puebla. Xicohtencatl has 14.8% of the total employment of the State of 
Tlaxcala with 32.4% of the value of the industrial production, while 
Teolocholco has 14.1% and employs 22.55% of the total employed in Tlaxcala. 
(Mele, 1986)
Cuautlancingo and Xoxtla, the two municipalities around 
Puebla, concentrate together 24% of the production in the state with 14.1% 
and 10.3% respectively, but this is because each one has one huge industry, 
the former has the Volkswagen plant and the latter has Hylsa's. They 
together have one quarter of the state's production but only 8% of the 
State of Puebla's the employment (ibidem.). This means they have the 
industries, but these do not seem to employ local population.
map 5-4
INDUSTRY IN PUEBLA’S REGION
TLAXCALA
SAN MARTIN
PUEBLA
ATLIXCO
5 10 Km0  1
KEY
— -  S ta te  limit* : : : : : : : : : :  INDUSTRIAL PARKS AND CORRIDORS
D Urban area 1 C QUETZALCOATL
mm Motorway 2 C MALINCHE
= Speedway 3 P PUEBLA 2 000
—— Road 4 P RESURRECCION
Railroad 5 P CINCO DE MAYO
♦ # .* Airport 6 P ZACATELCO
7 P XICOTZINGO
8 P PANZACOLA
130
5.8.1. Industry and the "National Interests"
The concentration of industry has also meant the gradual 
change in the use of the land from Puebla towards Mexico City, in the road 
Puebla-Tlaxcala and around the city itself. Land which is good for 
agriculture (Comision de Conurbacion del Centro, 1985; Bassols, 1979), thus 
it would probably be better to use it for agriculture than for industrial 
sites. One of the things which might made Volkswagen to settle in Puebla 
apart from the infrastructure factor, was the State's government decision 
to grant them the best tax exemptions available at the time and give the 
site away at a nominal price. T hat agricultural land was expropriated to 
"ejidatarios" (see note 2) which had the missfortune of having the flatest 
land around (Mele, 1986). In another example, the road Puebla-Tlaxcala one 
of the few irrigated districts in the state, has been partly invaded with 
industry settling there because its closeness to Puebla has made the State 
of Tlaxcala to declare part of it as the Malinche Industrial Corridor and 
give incentives to industry to locate there.
In the first example (the Volkswagen), the land which had 
being used for agriculture was expropriated to be used to subsidise foreign 
capital. To expropriate land which is ejido, it had to be done in the 
"public interest" (Por causa de utilidad publica). Meaning that it was 
more im portant for the nation to settle Volkswagen than to produce 
foodstuffs in that land. This is debatible though, since the Volkswagen 
did not necessarely needed to settle precisely there. There is no question 
of the benefits that such a big plant might represent to the country as a 
means of generating international currency and creating some jobs. The 
point is to use the benefits of that industry to develop the country. In a
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big country like Mexico is, there are options for industrial development 
throughout the territory. It does not necessarely have to be in the 
established centres of economic activity, mostly now when industry is more 
liberated from its factors of rigid spatial location it had a t the 
beginning (Castells, 1978).
The locational criteria followed by the industrialists was 
probably based in the advantages of the site, given the availability of 
infrastructure and its closeness to Mexico City, where the economic and 
political decisions are taken. These would do (they probably thought) the 
site better than any other elswhere. Given the circumstances of Volkswagen 
being the first major industrial plant coming to this state and being close 
to Mexico City, they might not have considered as their first reasons for 
example, the quality of the services offered by the city of Puebla or the 
size and quality of its labour force, since it probably was relatively 
small and unqualified. Therefore, provided the infrastructure was 
available, it could easily have been located in other place, since it does 
not need to be close to the D.F. to m arket its products or to make their 
decisions (they are probably taken somewhere in Germany).
An alternative place like the city of M onterrey's area in 
the north, for example, would have given the same level of infrastructure, 
and probaly better services and lower costs since for example, Hylsa's 
plant in M onterrey (and not Puebla's, [Mele,1986]) is supplying it today 
some of the 60% of national parts their cars must have for its national 
m arket (Johns, 1987). Thus saving time and money spent in transportation 
costs. It could have used the qualifications of local engeneers of the
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M onterrey Institute of Technology. Moreover, the plant probably would not 
be in the spatial centre of its national market, but it definitely would be 
closer to that of the USA, which is im portant since VW is now the sixth top 
exporter in Mexico (Ibidem.). Thus, from the industrialist's point of 
view, the benefits of Puebla's location would be outweighted in economic 
and functional terms by an alternative site, near for example, to 
Monterrey. In that way the benefits would also had been assimilated by the 
region. Since it would have attracted smaller and adaptable companies to 
this area's influence, creating a more balanced distribution of industry 
and economic activities in the country as well as in terms of taxes, 
employment and investment.
From the "national interests" point of view, the location of 
heavy industry in Puebla, increases investment near an already congested 
area, Mexico City. Therefore increasing the possibilities of its problems 
being encouraged to grow even more. Moreover, the State of Puebla, having 
already concentrated its economic activities in Puebla city, was in no need 
to concentrate them even more with a huge car m anufacturer's plant. This 
was not the answer it was needing to solve the problems its population 
have. It would have been better to use this industry to develop an area 
with more potential as an alternative development pole to Mexico City. So 
it is dubious that the national interests were really taken into account 
when expropriating that land.
Finally, the tax incentives offered and the low price of the 
site were used to subsidise international capital when it probably was in 
no need for it. Instead of national projects for development such as
Industry and the National Interests 133
agriculture mechanisation programmes which are im portant since most of 
Puebla's population in engaged in agriculture. Moreover, the advantages of 
being in Mexico (political stability, cheap labour, good infrastructure, 
near the US m arket etc.) alone, were probably sufficient to attract 
Volkswagen. T hat may be the main reason why they chosed Mexico in the 
first place, not the tax excemptions. They would not go for example, to 
Central America even if they were given better incentives. So those 
factors should have given the government the assurance of being powerfully 
negotiating with the industry, since it was in the interest of both 
parties. T hat would have given both, industrialists and governments 
(federal and state) benefits, since it assures a better socio-political 
stability, and a better basis to economic growth with social development.
The government's role should have been to encourage real 
decentralization by encouraging that industry to move to another place not 
too close to Mexico City, and use the subsidies to provide infrastructure 
in an alternative area. Time has shown that the benefits of this huge 
plant have not reached the majority of population of Puebla, since for 
example, employment figures showed that they may not be employing local 
population (see section 5.7. above), the state's income through local 
taxes is decreasing to very low levels (see chapter IV) even when some 
other smaller industries have been attracted to Puebla. The conditions of 
the majority of its population remain the same or even have deteriorated 
despite the size of investment made by VW or other major industries in the 
area such as PEM EX and Hylsa which together employ 16,460 people, showing 
the inexistence of so called trickle-down effects. Encouraging 
concentration, the possibilities of having social unrest and political
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instability are growing in the long-run.
5.8.2. Industry against agriculture?
In the second example, the Malinche Industrial Corridor (M ap 
5-4) was created in an area which the least thing one might expect to see 
was precisely industry. The road Puebla-Tlaxcala is surrounded by one of 
the very few irrigated districts in the region. This mean it is land which 
has been subject to heavy governmental investment to increase its 
agricultural production. The role of irrigated districts to the economy of 
the country is crutial since it means better agricultural products and even 
a means to produce more agricultural export value (Sanderson, 1986), which 
could be an alternative to industrial growth. A t the same time, it 
produces benefits directly to peasants and to the country, by avoiding for 
example the import of such products. Moreover, the south of the State of 
Tlaxcala (which is its portion adjacent to the city of Puebla as well as to 
its industrial zone) is where its better agricultural land is. Not so in 
the north, near to Apizaco, where the least good land for agriculture is.
So it is logical to think on its industrial activities to be carried out in 
that portion of the state or better, in the axis formed by the road to 
veracruz, which divides it the state at the middle, eastwards-westwards, 
and it is flater than the very north. In this way there would be a more 
direct and better communication with Mexico City and even there could be 
the possibility of creating a transport system independent from Puebla's; 
as well as the creation of regional services to avoid Tlaxcala's northern 
population to go to Puebla for those services, since for example the city
Industry against agriculture? 135
of Tlaxcala cannot perform because it is so close to Puebla city, the 
population rather go to the latter. This would encourage the creation in 
Apizaco, of one-step-down alternative services to Puebla, to serve even the 
north of tha t state.
Even more, by encouraging relatively small industry to 
settle near Apizaco, Tlaxcala could have developed its biggest city's 
activities, which have been restricted to some extent, by this Corridor 
Malinche. While the use of its irrigated district could had been exploited 
its agricultural performance in the south of the state, therefore having 
two different (and viable) sources of growth. The corridor's benefits of 
attracting industry by taking advantage of being close to the city of 
Puebla may have been overcomed by its misbenefits. It is spoiling first, 
Tlaxcala's agricultural production in one of the best areas of the state. 
Second, it is depressing the development of industry of an area which needs 
it more than the one where it is located. Thirdly, by doing so, it is 
increasing Tlaxcala's dependency on the city of Puebla, when also 
increasing the latter's problems. This have created problems like in San 
Pablo del Monte, the municipality in the state of Tlaxcala conurbated with 
the city of Puebla, where no notable industry is settled but 35% of its 
population is engaged in an industrial job, suggesting that most of them 
live in Tlaxcala but work in Puebla's industrial zone. Stressing the fact 
of Puebla's influence in the State of Tlaxcala. Dedicating part of the 
district to industry, it may have m eant to destroy one of the few 
opportunities the state had for an alternative source of growth. It also 
may be used to indicate the distortion on the state's priorities.
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5.9. Conclusion. Part II
The growth of industry in Puebla then, seems to have been on 
the base of the availability of infrastructure and suitable land, instead 
of a rational distribution of it through the territory of the state, in 
places where the investment is needed because of low productivity or to 
regenerate depressed areas. Instead it has contributed to its 
concentration in an already problematic city and in a region where the 
growth of the urban area may result in both administrativelly and 
politicaly increasing problems in the long-run. Such as Tlaxcala being 
faced with the decision to provide urban services to a population in an 
urban area which do not correspond to its priorities, which if it does, 
could attract more population to the area. It has also seem to have 
stopped alternative sources of growth to be raised. At the national level, 
it is clear that the investment in infrastrucuture and incentives to 
industry, which catalysed this growth, are not running accordingly to the 
deconcentration policies, at least there is not coordination between the 
central and state governments, and not even between states themselves, in 
how these policies are going to work, thus beginning to create oppossite 
results.
There is a prospect for a line of industry running all the 
way from the M AM C right to the city of Puebla up until now it is from 
Puebla to the city of San M artin, some 60 Kms. away (In 1981 and 1982, 90% 
of the firms which received help for relocating, settled in the area 
between Puebla and Sn. M artin. Secretaria de Economia, Estado de Puebla),
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exacerbating the problems of concentration and making Puebla more dependant 
in those terms on the central government. If instead an alternative 
investment in for example, modernising the old textile industry or 
mechanising the agricultural land to produce more and better products were 
made, the problems with concentration would probably not be as strong as 
they are now. That would have made even stronger the possibility of more 
remote regions in the state becoming increasingly prone to future 
investments in other kinds of industry. Finally it probably would have 
provided the basis for a more stable and reliable growth of the state. It 
could have made it more self-sufficient in economic terms, to face times of 
crisis and provide better for its population.
Does the federal government really think that the 
deconcentration of heavy industry to cities like Puebla would in the long 
term ameliorate the problems in the MAMC? It is increasing the city of 
Puebla's size and income, but not that of the rest of the state. It is 
increasing concentration, making some other regions more remote (even in 
the state of Puebla itself) to lose prospects of becoming development poles 
in the long term. The prospects unfortunately are that the process will 
continue. Catalystic actions have not stopped. The opening of the new 
Regional Airport of Puebla in Huejotzingo capable of receiving 'A
international flights, and the International Cargo Air Terminal in 
Atlangatepec, Tlaxcala, is likely to increase the concentration on an area 
around the M AM C creating a huge megalopolis with the surrounding states. 
Instead of really beginnig to create the alternative poles the country 
needs now for its development.
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It does not make sense and could be an enormous waste of 
time and money to make heavy investment to create economic gains in 
which could increase the possibility of social and political problems 
because of their closeness to the MAMC.
PART III
THE ROLE OF SPATIAL PLANNING
5.10. Introduction.
Puebla's spatial planning is a clear reflection and a 
consequence, of that at the national level.
It appeared early in the 1950's, relatively early to Latin 
American standards. Since the beginning, its principal objective has been 
"the localization of different urban elements in specific zones, whose area 
must be integraly dedicated to a concrete activity: housing, work, 
recreation... to avoid disruptions between activities'^ 1).
Since it was first implemented then, it was constrained to 
the very narrow role of "designing" cities. It was this first role which 
made it to be "appropriated" by architects, who invested as the profession 
with the know-how of design, thought the development of cities was a m atter 
of putting trees, plazas and assign every major activity a role to play in 
an specific part of the cities. But they restricted its applicability when 
they did not take into account economic, social or political factors that 
would influence the physical structure of a city. This is going to affect 
its output. These plans affected little or maybe nothing about the
(1) Plan Regulador de la Ciudad de Puebla. Gobiemo del Estado de Puebla, 
Puebla 1952.
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development of cities. But also this notion of planning achieving little 
or nothing will drive the government to make actions without taking into 
account not to say social or economic factors, but any planning 
consideration at all.
5.11. The early Plans.
In 1952, the "Esquema Director" (director sketch, literally) 
of the city of Puebla plan was one of the first attempts to "predict" (more 
than to plan. I would say) the development of the city of Puebla. It set 
in the north-east within the city boundaries, an industrial zone, separated 
from the housing area by a thin green area (map 5-4). This distribution 
was almost wholly taken again by the second effort, the 1959 plan (map 5- 
5), the difference between them was that the motorway Puebla to Mexico City 
was considered as a potential industrial zone and was integrated to the 
second plan. The proposed industrial area then, follows the motorway when 
it crosses the city boundaries. There is also, unlike in the previous one, 
consideration for an area of reserve for future industrial growth.
From these early stages then, the arrival of the motorway is 
considered as a major impact in the shape and development of the city. It 
is indeed the motorway and its use as an industrial area w hat is going to 
trigger the industrial development of the city of Puebla.
But reality was not as easy as it was drawn on those plans.
They were outweighted by the industrialists' locational decisions as well
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as governmental decisions, who did not follow the patterns planners 
expected. Since 1960 a number of industries settled within the urban area 
without taking into account any consideration made by those plans. 
Industry began to settle in Tlaxcala state's portion of the road to the 
city of Tlaxcala, which probably triggered later Tlaxcala's decision to 
make it the Malinche Industrial Corridor (see Part II of this chapter); in 
a series of areas in the urban area at the north of the city and in the 
area of the industrial parks "Conde" and "Resurreccion" which were not even 
considered in those plans.
5.12. City and State Plans, not Planning.
It was until the late 1970's when a new attem pt was made to 
plan the City and the State of Puebla's development. It was the time when 
Sahop (Secretariat of Human Settlements and Public Works) designed its 
"System of Cities". This time, a State's U rban Development Plan was first 
made (1978), and according to its guidelines, a plan for the city of Puebla 
was made (1979). Puebla was classified by the national system of cities as 
a "Medium City for Regional Services". It was meant to serve and influence 
the development of the whole region. However, that fact does not seems to 
have been fully considered, since it appears the plan only considered 
further growth in the city, without thinking in the repercusions tha t would 
have to the state and the rest of its hinterland.
The U rban Director Plan of the City of Puebla, together with 
the State's Development Plan then, seem to have some discrepancies with the
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national decentralization policies. Despite the fact of being in Zone Illb  
"Consolidation", the urban plan reads (Mele, 1986): "...talking about 
consolidation implies the compromise to a 60% growth of the city of 
Puebla's industry up until 1990, and of a 50% between 1990 and 2,000." 
This, together with the 1972 law which gave benefits to those industries 
not benefited by the Federal Law, clearly contradict federal dispositions.
Thus from the beginning the direction things would take was 
stated. Moreover, more recently, the state's Development Plan of 1984(2) 
is proposing to reinforce and improve the city of Puebla's infrastructure 
to be able to receive and incorporate population and economic activities 
from Mexico City.
They did not seem to have considered the possibilities of 
for example, developing a network of industrial parks throughout the state. 
Not least the possibilities of other alternatives like for example, 
encouraging the restructuring of the traditional industry or the creation 
of a new one in the state, independent from Mexico City's. Hence, in order 
to meet economic targets (60% growth) the social implications of spreading 
more reasonably the investment seem to have beeen ignored. No spatial 
consideration was made in the economic policies apart from concentration of 
industrial growth in Puebla city. Subsequently, they are likely to rely on 
Mexico City's ability to decentralize its industry. Then implying a 
competence with the rest of states in Central Region to gain those 
industries, instead of for example, cooperation between them to rationalize
(2) Plan de Desarrollo del Estado de Puebla. Gobiemo del estado de Puebla, 
Puebla 1984. p29 cited by Mele, 1986.
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decentralization throughout the region.
This is emphasized by the fact that the state government 
since the opening of the motorway, has tried to attract industry to its 
territory but seemengly without taking fully into account the consequences 
of its actions. As an example, in 1963 it expropriated in the "Public 
Interest" 239 Ha. of ejidos(3), around the motorway in the north of the
city, to sell as an industrial park. But it resulted in a number of
unespecified uses being allowed in an area of the city m eant to be reserved 
to industry. From the total 230 Ha. only 33 were actually used as 
industrial park, the rest was used for a number of uses which sometimes 
were incompatible with each other like the new "Central de Abastos" 
(Foodstuff Suppliers' Central) of the city, and housing.
Some parts of it were used by private developers to 
speculate with land, but unable to do it, the land has been unused ever 
since, while the ejidatarios lost their livelihood. In yet another part of 
this site, some 100 families settled illegaly, but now they have been 
regularized by the authorities, which means that urban services have to be 
provided in an area again, which was not m eant to be used for housing.
The governmental action then, resulted in the disruption of 
the city's structure and even created social demand for services in and
area not supossed to be needed.
(3) Expropriation of ejidos is the preferred method since it is the 
cheapest and almost trouble-free, which enables the government to offer the sites to 
industry at nominal prices. They are normally paid to ejidatarios at prices much below 
the market.
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When in 1979 the U rban Director Plan arrived, it set the 
limits of the industrial areas where this and other parks where already 
established. They still were located in the north and around the motorway, 
but now more dispersed, following the patterns industrial growth took, 
then, implicitly justifiying their emergence (map 5-6). Again, there seems 
not to be planning, only the description of w hat already happened. This 
awakenes certain doubts about the whole process since, being plans one of 
the intruments required by federal agencies to decide the investments to be 
made in cities and regions, plans provide state government with a tool to 
for example, justify actions that have been carried out by the state but 
need federal back-up, or indeed to justify their actions before the public 
or federal government.
There is of course the fact tha t given the structure of 
planning, planners cannot decide directly where the investment can be done, 
since it has to be done by either other state or federal agencies, or the 
private sector itself. But this does not unable them to propose the best 
options for the development of the city. They should have taken planning 
as the government's instrum ent to negotiate the best options with other 
governmental agencies or the private sector. In this way, even if the 
development does not take place as "predicted", there will be the assurance 
of the best options being taken into account. The so-called "flexibility" 
in planning should refer to this, not to propose in latter plans what 
previous ones failed to "predict".
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5.13. Regional Planning.
W hat began as isolated actions by creating parks where the 
industrial demand were, are now taking the shape of a huge concentration of 
all kinds of industry in the centre of the State of Puebla.
Now the government is considering the implications of this 
growth within the region, either by genuine concern or demand by other 
sectors. A regional study is being carried out (October, 1987) covering 
the area between Puebla and San M artin, to see the implications of the 
industrial corridors, together with the impacts of Huejotzingo's airport in 
the area. Yet again, the study is carried out after the actions were taken 
which can make one to have doubts about how its proposals are likely to be. 
However, the validity of its outcome will depend on the planners' ability 
to include in their study not only the narrow-view of the patterns of 
spatial distribution of industrial settlements throughout the study area, 
but the wider social and economic implications these will have in the whole 
region. It will be im portant also, that it would consider local 
population's needs and representation in the process. On that will depend 
in a way, the importance planning will have in the eyes of the population 
as well as the government's, to be considered seriously as an agent for 
change.
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5.14. Conclusion Part III
Planning's confinement to the physical design and land use 
patterns of cities has restricted its participation in the process of 
economic and social development in Puebla. It apparently has failed to 
signal to economic planners as well as polititians the limits or 
alternatives of industrial growth in the city and region of Puebla.
Industrialization, being a "tool" federal government is 
using to achieve economic growth in the national context, has impacted upon 
the State of Puebla without prior planning on part of the State government. 
Most of the local policies for economic growth have tried to attract as 
much industry as they can from the surroundings of Mexico City. They have 
done so without considering properly the implications this would have on 
the region's economic and social development. Consequently, the rural and 
peripheral areas have been largely neglected by industrialization and the 
pattern of industrial development has been haphazard in terms of its 
locational composition.
Moreover, it can be argued that as planners did not provide 
polititians with relevant and feasible plans, decisions on the location and 
character of investment were taken without reference to the planners. 
Planners seem to have overlooked the fact tha t planning can be a useful 
instrum ent to achieve beneficial outcomes for society. It could be an 
instrum ent to negotiate with other interests in society the best options 
for development (although this might require a more democratic political 
process).It could also be a useful social instrum ent if used to signal the
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needs and espectations of the poor in society.
Finally, in tha t way also, planners seem to have renegated 
their role in society. They have not taken a strong position themselves, a 
more "combative" role in deciding the future of our cities. Perhaps 
planning should not have been trying to "predict" the future pattern of 
development, but to shape the process of development as an instrument of 
negotiation between different groups in society to achieve better solutions 
to urban problems.
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THE ALTERNATIVES
CHAPTER VI 
THE POSSIBLE IN PHYSICAL PLANNING
6.1. Introduction.
As it was showed in previous chapters, since early 1960's 
public and private money has been allocated into Puebla's region as huge 
investment in infrastructure and industrial development, which in turn, 
created even further concentration of economic and political powers in the 
centre of the country. This, at the time when national policies were 
supposedly aimed at industrial decentralization, a more balanced 
development of the country, and to make more regions to share the benefits 
of economic growth. These clear contradictions might be better understood 
if compared against the background of social policies and physical planning 
most probably being introduced as a measure to calm-down the growing social 
unrest which emerged in late 1960's. Therefore, they probably were 
introduced by the government as a short-time remedy, looking primarly for 
legitimacy and not with a real commitment to them.
Even so, there have been some achievements in planning.
They have been primarly in terms of identifying problem areas and potential 
development zones, relatively better equiped states' planning departments, 
most of the im portant cities having an urban development plan coherent with 
a local State's Development Plan, and most im portant of all, a Planning Law 
being passed. But unfortunately, the principal problems still remain, as 
in the case of Puebla, in terms of central control over investment,
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infrastructure and im portant projects, which affect directly the 
development of those regions, making then, local plan's proposals obsolete, 
since their achievement might be out of local planners' hands. All these 
in the end, is making in real terms, planning to be an activity whose 
output is centrally controled which have stopped im portant goals to be 
achieved. This in turn, has jeopardized proper local development.
The overall absence of positive results in implementing 
urban planning policies can be seen as the result of two principal 
problems. First: the "mutual untrust" and sometimes "incompatibility" 
between politicians and "technocrats" (Camp, 1985). Both groups' different 
backgrounds (experiences and values) have prevent them from communicating 
with one another (Camp, 1985; W ard, 1986). Which have resulted in 
politicians not given planners an im portant role in deciding the national 
development policies; and two: planners themselves might have not been able 
to fully understand reality as well as their role in the decision-making 
process. These two arguments will be explored in the next two sections and 
will form the basis for the alternative approach suggested in the 
conclusion of this chapter.
6.2. The Political Decisions in Planning.
By having control of the planning system, politicians can be 
sure of having control over the entire decision-making process and 
obviously, over the fullfilment of their group's interests. Then, 
technocrats (or "tecnicos") may be seen by them as a threat, because if
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they are given im portant responsibilities, they might begin to be 
indispensable when taking decisions. Moreover, urban development planning 
might also be seen as a threat to their interests since it proposes a more 
balanced share of economic growth, which clearly contrasts for example, 
with their hopes for capital accumulation.
In tha t way, the numerous agencies involved directly or 
indirectly in the urban development process, make easier for politicians 
firstly: to depend less in the tecnicos; secondly, not to allow urban 
planning an im portant role, which in turn might reward them with further 
advantages as either to "accomodate" better to changing circumstances of 
social demand, or to have a wider range of options open to them to chose 
from. All these being perfectly backed-up by a formally set up planning 
system. In thay way also, if problems arise, politicians do not have a 
share in the blame, which is always going to be on planners for not 
properly considering their policies' results. On the other hand, if 
certain aims are fulfilled, politicians can always argue to have the 
"responsibility" of producing the best out of planning policies.
So, the output of planning may still be controlled by 
politicians even when they are not supossedly involved. Those might be 
some of the reasons why despite the decentralization policies, heavy 
investment in Puebla's infrastructure and industry was made (which seems 
not to have yet, reached the entire population of the state), and not in 
other non-central states.
For this to happen, politicians might have relied -apart
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from a web-like structure for planning- on two factors. One: while Sedue's 
(Sahop's at the time) planners were allowed by the political system to 
propose all the well-oriented policies they wanted, the instruments to 
implement them did not exist or were not changed at the same time, and 
planners did not have control over tha t fact. Thus their policies found 
severe structural barriers which stopped them since the beginning.
Two, by later giving full legal planning powers to 
municipalities to plan their own development, but still the centre 
retaining control over the investment decisions, and other central agencies 
being in charge of carry out some of those actions, the role of local 
planners was reduced to simply "follow" the patterns of development for 
their cities, which may have been already decided elsewhere in the centre. 
While again, central politicians cannot be blamed for possible failures as 
the responsibilities for planning are in the local authorities at the 
municipal level.
An example of all these can be the "Pilot Programme of 
Historic Centres" in the State of Tlaxcala(l). Its "need" was found by the 
then State Governor and Sedue's secretary. A list of possible places was 
drawn and a deadline set by them to carry out eight Partial Plans of 
Historic Centre, including their catalogue of buildings of historical 
importance. Then it was planners' task to co-ordinate themselves to make 
those plans. It was agreed to make half the plans (four) in Sedue's 
central offices in Mexico City, and the other half in the state's U rban 
Development Secretary (Secodure), all by private contractors, even when it 
would have been cheaper and probably better if they were made by local and
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Sedue's planners. Later, given Secodure's shortage of founds, another plan 
had to be made in the central offices. When finished, they were presented 
to the municipal authorities for final "approval" and comments.
The implications of this are that A) The programme was 
agreed without really knowing if it was needed. It was possible that there 
were in other states, historically more im portant places than the ones 
selected, or different and more im portant areas in which to invest instead.
B) Supossing the plans were really needed, the fact th a t most (and the more 
important) of them were made in central offices and probably by planners 
without previous or little knowledge of the areas, since most of them were 
exercising in Mexico City, made dubious their outcome and the applicability 
of their final proposals. C) The fact of official planners being displaced 
(on the grounds of "austerity measures") by private consultants can be 
translated into the government's misstrust to its own planners and/or the 
way in which it can indirectly, support the private sector. D) Obviously 
in the proposals, the local municipalities' participation was not 
considered since the plans were only presented to them at the end, for 
"aproval", and finally, E) It was a political decision taken at the top and 
probably not based on planning considerations w hat started all up and not a 
social need.
Then, if it could be possible to extrapolate the examples - 
supported by the findings of our case study- to the national context, it
(1) The following information was obtained by the author between December 
1985 and June 1986, while being working as Sedue's adviser to the state of Tlaxcala when 
those plans were made, and in talks with authorities/officials in Secodure, Sedue's 
Delegation and Sedue's central offices.
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becomes clear that physical planning has played only a subsidiary role to 
political decisions, and has been the instrum ent of politicians to make 
some concessions (primarly as a political discourse towards a "shared 
development") but in the end, to disguise more capital accumulation in the 
centre. Thus it seems it is those political decisions what is going to 
affect the development of the cities and regions, and not planning or at 
least a real concern about social needs. It can be argued that if it would 
had been otherwise, further concentration would have been avoided. Then, 
it is not only the endowement of the areas which may make concentration to 
self-perpetuate, it is also the politicians' desire to increase economic 
accumulation in those areas. The circle can be broken, and it is in the 
political decision's side. If the government were commited to social 
changes, they could be done.
6.3. Planning ahead reality.
(The so-called "Flexibility in Planning")
As said in this chapter's introduction, the second reason
for planning having very few positive results, might be a consequence of
the planners' unability to understand the relationships between built 
enviroment (spatial relations) and social relations.
As it was discussed in Chapter V, most planners in Mexico
are architects. This poses several problems, being two of the most
im portant of all, the fact of their professional status (they remain 
architects, but exercising planning) and educational background. These are
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not designed to make them to understand social and economic processes that 
might influence cities and regions' development. Therefore their policies' 
scope will tend to be too narrow and probably biased towards the "design" 
of the areas, more than to make a real approach to the solutions of the 
cities' problems.
This has led them, as showed in the case study, to make 
proposals which sound politically good but might be unrealistic. T h a t 
would make plans after another in the same city, to have different 
proposals, or to justify w hat already appeared, which in the end may mean 
to reflect w hat the elite in power has done, since most of the actions 
plans would justify seem to be in reality, controlled and decided by them. 
Planners may justify these constant changes in policies, as the necessary 
"flexibility" needed in planning because of the changing and unpredictable 
nature of development. But probably those changes instead of tha t 
"flexibility", would be covering-up the unability to give real options to 
development, according to the characteristics of a given area. For 
example, when the 1982 plan of the city of Puebla (Chapter V) decided to 
propose as industrial area only places where already industry was 
established, it clearly was not doing it because of flexibility, but most 
probably because it was unable to give another better option.
It would be naive to ask planners to be ahead of reality in 
terms of knowing exactly what is going to happen in the development of a 
city. But it is not impossible to ask them to understand the processes and 
give feasible options to the development of those cities. This is 
im portant since otherwise, plans may fail to provide what Castells (1978)
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calls "instruments of negotiation" between different sectors of society. 
They would fail to provide a basic platform from which the investment 
decisions might be agreed between different sectors of society ie. 
business/government/public. This was clearly stressed for example, at the 
national level, when president Echeverria's social policies had to be 
modiffied or dropped altogether because the business and industrial sectors 
thought they were going too far (chapters III and V). Or at the local 
level, in the case of housing being built in areas where local authorities 
did not like (even when it was needed) because it was a conservation area 
(see chapter III).
On the other hand, as it was showed in the case study, 
flexibility has probably m eant taking advantage of national policies to 
attract industry indiscriminately, resulting in the disruption of the 
city's structure by for example, unplanned "industrial sites" (Chapter V) 
together with increased concentration, both of which, it can be argued, 
could have been avoided.
6.4. The Alternatives.
It seems then, that planners might have not yet, completely 
understood the system of decision making, to take advantage of it.
It may seem a contradiction to ask to state planners that 
they need to take a position other than the government's in the planning 
process. But it is needed so. It is very well to set national policies
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which pretend a better development of the country, but if those policies at 
the end have any applicability in the context they have to operate, they 
become useless, a mere ideological exercise.
They need to give to government, industrialists and public, 
an instrum ent to help them to decide the investment/actions to take. T hat 
does not mean they should be neutral. On the contrary, there cannot be 
given feasible or proper options to the development of a given area if a 
position is not held by the proponent. Planners ought to make their 
proposals having a side on the problems and then with those plans negotiate 
the best viable solution. Planners should take the side of the people who 
do not have a say or means in the development process, th a t means the 
popular sectors. If not, they themselves will do it, in fact they might be 
beginning to do it.
There is of course, the central government's "need" for 
economic growth, it is unavoidable, given the economic circumstances of our 
country for example, it still will be their first priority for a long time.
But there is also the need for social development of the majority of 
population. That is also unavoidable, and it is going to be, insofar 
attitudes do not change. Making politically-oriented social concessions 
from time to time, to keep the system going, will not necessarely provide 
in the end, social development or even political stability. Planners 
cannot just sit and wait for changes to come, they must act and take an 
active role in deciding the future of our cities. T hat sounds good but 
how?. Local planners could have an im portant role to play.
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The policy trends in Mexico -influenced strongly by 
institutions such as the IM F- seem to be going away from the state 
providing for the poor (Gardner, 1987; Safa, 1987). This makes more 
im portant to stress the role urban planners in particular, may play in this 
process. State planners, being part of the system, might hold the key for 
change from inside, towards a more socially-oriented practise, specially 
local planners. The big problem is that over the past few years, the state 
has allienated itself from these groups (Safa, 1987).
However, at the level of states, things might still not be 
as bad as at the central level. Local planners know the people, their 
cities and regions, and posses the information about the problems they are 
facing. They are more able than central planners to find ways of 
"mobilising" and organising planning at the grassroots. Here is where all 
may start-up again, and might be the reason for central politicians to 
reconsider their attitudes towards the development of regions. In this way 
also, planners may find an alternative, better and first-hand way of 
understanding the problems facing our cities. Wynnia (1972) argues tha t 
planners in Latin America often find "bureaucratic barriers" to their 
proposals. These can be more easily broken-up if planners/community 
support one another and act as a pressure group. As regards to for 
example, the money needed to invest, grassroots movements already have 
found alternative sources (Jatoba, 1987; Safa, 1987), and some other sources 
might be found by both groups acting together. In this way the limits of 
urban planning in Mexico might be set by the people themselves.
Chapter VII
CONCLUSION
7.1. A new planning system or a new view of the problems?
The evidence presented so far has tried to dem onstrate that 
planning's positive results are minimal compared with w hat they should had 
been. Then, in order to correct these trends, should we ask for changes in 
the way planners shall see the urban and regional problems? or is it a 
m atter of actually asking for the planning system as a whole to be changed.
The answer is probably a mixture of both. The political 
system -which controls planning- is too complex and old it needs a complete 
re-structuring not only in the concernig to urban planning matters, but the 
entire national affairs. We have given evidence that by the government 
giving priority to economic growth and by subordinating physical planning, 
concentration has been increased and the chances for local development may 
have been jeopardised.
It is difficult to argue that the planning system needs to 
be changed, because most of the things needed may have already been laid 
down. States are responsible for adopting the national guidelines 
according to their needs, and the municipalities alone are responsible for 
local plans, even a "Democratic Planning Law" has been passed. Rather, it 
is the structure into which this system has been laid down which is making 
it too difficult to achieve results. There are so many alternatives to the
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government to go round it, planning's role becomes in reality, obsolete.
The mechanisms available should be bound by the planning system to avoid 
failures.
On the other hand, although changes in the political system 
should result in changes in the planning system, it is planners' task to 
change the present trends, otherwise, the political system will not 
appreciate the reasons for changing it, since they are fulfilling their own 
interests. A change in planners' attitude should result in better plans.
But planning is not only a m atter of making good plans. It is also a 
m atter of implementing their plans, and their proposals becoming reality. 
Changes in the quality of plans alone, obviously cannot deliver social 
development, this is where changes in the system are needed. These may be 
achieved by making changes in bureaucracy, tax distribution,, educacion and 
political commitment:
A) Bureaucratic changes and real devolution.
The number of secretariats and planning departments involved 
in the process are obviously creating the biggest barriers to policy 
implementation as well as overlapping of functions. Planning should be a 
co-ordinated activity to allow a "corporate" view of the problems and avoid 
waste of time and money in expensive but perhaps non-needed-in-the-area 
projects. States should have a say and influence these decisions. Control 
over quangos' output should also help. Their investment decisions should be 
bound not only by the general national guidelines, but by the local plans 
of the areas in which they plan to invest to prevent duplication or un­
necessary use of resources. But it is within Sedue's departments where
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perhaps the biggest changes are needed. Central offices' work is 
duplicating its own delegations and states'. Sedue should become an 
"information/promotion" agency of the states' programmes and the states 
themselves should make local planning, while Sedue should restraint itself 
to aggregate policy making and monitoring. Giving real planning duties to 
the states should result in devolution, therefore decentralization of 
decision-making.
B) Federal tax redistribution = more local self-sufficiency.
Given their lack of economic resources, state and municipal 
governments are sometimes unable to carry out some im portant actions. This 
may drive them, it was argued, to "fight" at almost any cost for investment 
to be made in their territories, causing "un-rational" actions, with 
negative results in the long term. Then, a more distributive federal tax 
structure should give local governments a better chance to fund their most 
im portant projects without having to rely heavely on federal organisations 
for their funding. This should result in more self-sufficient regions.
C) Educational changes = better plans.
Planners' attitude towards urban problems and their solution 
might change if they receive an educational background which enables them 
to be critical of the system in which they are going to exercise, and links 
them to the social reality of Mexico. Being critical of the system should 
allow planners to perceive the problems with another perspective, different 
from tha t of the government itself, avoiding the danger of being only 
"justifiying" government's actions. In that way also, they will not find 
themselves allienated from the basic role of planning: to be a socially
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oriented practise.
D) Political commitment = better structure/system.
To get politicians' commitment should be one of the first 
priorities. Being planning now an activity without spending powers, it 
depends on political decisions which might trigger development in a given 
area. Planning should reverse those trends and influence those political 
decisions by having the sufficient power to be taken into consideration.
As argued in Chapter VI, local planners should be able to "force" 
politicians to change their minds by demonstrating they work with and are 
backed by, the social groups or organisations at the grassroots. T hat will 
give planning the strength it lacks now. It would make politicians think 
twice all decisions likely to be cosmetic gestures.
7.2. Economic against Social Development?.
A good deal of the lack of political commitment to physical 
planning comes, this dissertation argues, by the priority given to economic 
growth. T hat assertion's validity should be considered in the context of 
economic growth in Mexico being easier to achieve simply by increasing 
concentration of industry and investment in areas which already enjoy 
certain levels of infrastructure.
It is not tha t social development is going to be achieved 
simply by making physical planning to work properly, nor economic planning. 
Economic and urban plannings do not necessirely have to be exclusive of one
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another. In fact, their aims might be complementary. It has been argued 
throughout this work, that the problems come when one of those is given 
priority over the other, which makes the proposals biased towards one of 
those aspects. If economic growth would had been tried to be achieved 
considering its spatial implications, things might had been different. 
Alternative cities would have emerged making in that way, more efficient 
the use of infrastructure and investment.
By giving full priority to economic planning and relegating 
its physical and distributional implications, the government might be 
creating economic growth, but not economic development. They, as I 
understand them, are different. Economic development would give the 
country a more rational and equitable distribution of infrastructure, 
economic activities and population, therefore, the self-sufficiency it 
needs to depend less from the exterior. Economic growth is profit-related 
and tends to benefit the elites of politicians and industrialists. This in 
turn, might create further dependency on external markets and lending 
institutions because the country would not really be funding real basis for 
growth.
7.3. The policy implications.
Governmental actions are definitely influential in the 
pattern of development the country has had. Changes are needed to counter 
act deficiencies and achieve better living standars for the majority of 
population. They are needed to make more efficient the use of scarce
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resources. These should be taken at all levels of policy-making, from the 
international right to the very local of cities.
A t the international level, a more diversified market for a 
more diversified number of products is needed. Although the latter may be 
beginning to appear after the collapse in oil prices, the need to diversify 
markets is urgent, that should allow to different regions to look for 
alternative sources/markets in times of crisis.
A t the national level, this diversification should allow for 
the different endowments of the different regions to develop, this in turn, 
might create a series of "especialized" regions, which should increase 
their population's incomes, thus an internal market could be developed.
As in the case study, some of the problems which created 
further concentration in the central region were because of an increase in 
the am ount of investment in infrastructure in the region. T hat implies for 
the future, to make a more rational distribituion of the investment, to 
make it more efficient in terms of taking advantage of the region's 
endowements and real posibilities for development. Industry might not be 
the answer to all regions. As with the purpose-built turist towns, 
alternatives might be found to different regions according to their 
characteristics. Mexico is sufficiently varied in resources and people to 
offer lots of alternatives for economic and social development.
Public control over major economic development decisions, 
should mean to "guide" economic decisions to make them to be shared in a
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more egalitarian way. Im portant decisions should take into consideration 
the needs of regions and their population and use these projects and 
investments to attract and/or trigger development. Altough some investment 
would still be needed in the central region, the priorities should be 
changed to the rest of the country.
As diffusion of innovation plays an im portant role in 
development, a more rational and not centre-lead network of communications 
including roads should be developed linking im portant urban centres.
A t the level of states, the distribution of investment, 
although not completely disperse, should be directed to alternative areas 
according to a coherent and realistic "system of urban-rural centres", to 
allow to filter down more easily the benefits of any urban or agricultural 
development to those less accesible areas. It could also prevent the great 
disparities within the states, where after the capital cities, little 
alternatives there are for investment and migration.
Finding alternatives for development might be easier if 
information is shared between municipalities and states relating to their 
problems, this means a more co-operative approach to the local problems, 
instead of the normal "paternalistic" one in which states "know" all the 
answers for local problems, instead of trying to find common solutions.
In the cities, local planners might be the key for a 
reliable success for planning. They are the contact between government and 
public. They need to know all the problems their cities are facing by
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involving themselves in the process. Public participation should mean the 
public may influence the decisions tha t are taken in plans, not as until 
now, tha t plans rarely are publicly known. The poor is already beginning 
to organise themselves in the light of the little attention they have been 
given by planners; while community and national bussinessmen are taking 
block actions to halt actions they think are against their interests. In 
these two cases, the latter is the more powerful to bargain changes in 
policies, while the former is not. For this group, planning might be the 
solution to open a door to development. All policies and proposals should 
be given taken into account people's problems. For example, if in the case 
study, planners instead of trying to design the "perfect" city, were trying 
to find real solutions to its problems by contacting and talking with all 
sectors of community, they would probably had found what was really needed.
All these changes, we know, are not an easy task, nor they 
would be done in the short-term. But they are needed to overcome the 
present discrepancies in living standards in different regions within the 
country. They are needed to make Mexico a better place to most Mexicans. 
If Mexican planners become more aware of the context in which these 
problems are occurring, we could say changes are in their way to become 
reality.
(approx. 34480 words)
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